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Over the past twenty years, prolife advocates have sought to control 
the political narrative of abortion by misappropriating women’s history. 
Conservatives, led by the group Feminists for Life (FFL), have used his-
torical feminist icons to support their antiabortion advocacy. Federal an-
tiabortion legislation has been named after feminist heroines.1 Amicus 
briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court quote women’s rights leaders in support 
of abortion regulation.2 And political forums for college students popu-
larize the notion that feminists historically opposed abortion.3 Prolife 
groups claim that “[w]ithout known exception, the early American femi-
nists condemned abortion in the strongest possible terms.”4 This political 
narrative, however, misconstrues the historical evidence. It invents rather 
than describes history, blatantly ignoring the text, context, and spirit of 
the work of the women it appropriates. Such misuse of history diminish-
es, rather than enhances, the credibility of this antiabortion advocacy. 
The appeal to historical figures in the abortion debate is powerful 
because it utilizes the gravitas of feminist heroines to challenge the exist-
ing legal and political assumption that abortion is a cornerstone of sex 
equality. The use of feminist leaders suggests that women themselves, 
                                                 
 1. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 
3541, 112th Cong. (2011); Elizabeth Cady Stanton Pregnant and Parenting Students Services Act of 
2005, S. 1966, H.R. 4265, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 2. Brief for Feminists for Life as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bray v. Alexandria 
Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) [hereinafter FFL Bray Brief]; Brief of Feminists for 
Life as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
[hereinafter FFL Casey Brief]; Brief for the American Academy of Medical Ethics as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (supporting the constitutionality of informed consent 
laws and arguing rhetorically—“why were nineteenth-century feminists, even the most militant, 
adamantly opposed to the legality of abortion?”); Brief for Feminists for Life as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Appellants, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) [hereinafter FFL Webster 
Brief]; Brief of Feminists for Life as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, City of Akron v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) [hereinafter FFL Akron Brief]. 
 3. See Mary Meehan, Feminists for Life on Campus, 34 HUM. LIFE REV. 64, 68 (2008); Laury 
Oaks, What Are Pro-Life Feminists Doing on Campus?, 21 NAT’L WOMEN STUD. ASS’N J. 178, 183 
(2009); Serrin M. Foster, Op-Ed., Pregnant Student Services Act, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005. 
 4. Serrin M. Foster, The Feminist Case Against Abortion, AM. FEM. Fall 2002, at 19, available 
at http://www.feministsforlife.org/taf/2002/Fall2002/Fall2002.pdf, reprinting Serrin M. Foster,  
The Feminist Case Against Abortion, COMMONWEALTH, Sept. 13, 1999, and reprinted in THE COST 
OF “CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION 33 (Erika Bachiochi ed., 2004), and in 
GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY: WOMEN’S RIGHTS (Jennifer A. Hurley ed., 2001); see also JOSEPH 
W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 392 (2006) (claiming that “the 
leading feminists of the nineteenth century were virtually unanimous in supporting the prohibition of 
abortion as a crime because of a professed concern to protect prenatal human life”). 
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even radical feminist women like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. 
Anthony,5 have traditionally opposed abortion.6 If these feminist leaders 
indeed opposed abortion, the historical story would seem to bolster the 
claim that abortion is not in the best interests of women.7 
The need to create a history of antiabortion feminists seems im-
portant today because abortion has come to be equated with women’s 
rights. Since the second wave of the women’s liberation movement in the 
late 1960s, feminists have identified abortion as a foundational right for 
women upon which all other economic and educational rights rest.8 The 
appeal to feminist history by prolife advocates offers a counter-narrative 
in which women dedicated to improving the economic and educational 
rights of women reject abortion as a gender-based right. This story of 
women leaders opposing abortion is thus aimed at undermining the pre-
vailing feminist and legal view that a woman’s right to bodily autonomy 
and reproductive choice is a privacy right of constitutional dimension 
going to the heart of gender equality. 
The lack of popular knowledge about the lives and work of wom-
en’s rights leaders facilitates the co-opting of the historical feminist nar-
rative by antiabortion activists. Most people, politicians, and policymak-
ers lack a familiarity with these women’s lives or their work, much less 
the details of their philosophies and speeches. It is therefore easy to make 
the claim that a feminist leader had a particular belief because few are 
                                                 
 5. These relatively well-known women, along with Lucretia Mott, are memorialized in an 
unfinished statue (once relegated to the basement) in the Rotunda of the Capitol, and dubbed “Three 
Women in a Tub” for the bathtub-like blob of uncut stone at its base. Portrait Monument: Suffrage 
Pioneers, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, http://www.aoc.gov/cc/art/rotunda/suffrage.cfm  (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2012). Antiabortion advocates also cite to Mary Wollstonecraft, Victoria Woodhull, and 
Alice Paul. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 4, at 375, 381; PROLIFE FEMINISM: YESTERDAY AND 
TODAY (Mary Krane Derr et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
 6. The term “feminist” was first coined around 1898 in France, but it did not enter common 
parlance in the United States until 1913. This Article uses the term retroactively, though others de-
bate the ahistorical use of the term. See Karen Offen, Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical 
Approach, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 119–57 (1988); see also Nancy F. Cott, Com-
ment on Karen Offen’s “Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach,” 15 SIGNS: J. 
WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 1, 203 (1989). 
 7. See Linda C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women Who Oppose Abortion 
Rights in the Name of Feminism, in FEMINIST NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT ODDS: FEMINISM AND THE 
PROBLEM OF SISTERHOOD 159, 165 (Susan Ostrov Weisser & Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994). 
 8. See Betty Friedan, Abortion: A Woman’s Civil Right (Feb. 1969), reprinted in BEFORE ROE 
V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 
38–40 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2010); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of 
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”); Sylvia Law, 
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1028 (1994). 
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able to challenge it.9 Despite the ease and utility of creating a feminist 
history against abortion, the narrative is simply not true. Sound bites that 
have been excised from history are taken out of context to convey a 
meaning not originally intended.10 
To examine the veracity of the political and legal claims of a femi-
nist history against abortion, this Article focuses on one of the leading 
icons used in antiabortion advocacy—Elizabeth Cady Stanton.11 Stanton 
has, quite literally, been the poster child for FFL’s historical campaign 
against abortion, appearing on posters, flyers, and commemorative coffee 
mugs.12 Advocates claim that Stanton is a particularly fitting spokesper-
son because she was a “feisty gal who had seven children and was out-
spokenly pro-life.”13 They claim that she “condemned abortion in the 
strongest possible terms”14 and was “a revolutionary who consistently 
advocated for the rights of women, for women’s education, for the cele-
bration and acceptance of motherhood—and for the protection of chil-
dren, born and unborn.”15 FFL represented to the Supreme Court that 
“Elizabeth Cady Stanton clearly argued that the liberation of women was 
                                                 
 9. Scholars tried to set the historical record straight on Susan B. Anthony as she became a 
figurehead of antiabortion activists, but they have been ignored. Ann Gordon & Lynn Sherr, Sarah 
Palin is No Susan B. Anthony, WASH. POST (May 21, 2010), http://onfaith.washingtonpost.com/ 
onfaith/guestvoices/2010/05/sarah_palin_is_no_susan_b_anthony.html; Stacy Schiff, Desperately 
Seeking Susan, Op-Ed., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/13/opinion/ 
13schiff.html?pagewanted=all; Christine Stansell, Meet the Anti-Abortion Group Pushing Presiden-
tial Politics to the Extreme Right, NEW REPUBLIC (July 11, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/ poli-
tics/91669/abortion-pledge-susan-b-anthony-republicans-romney. For more on the Anthony contro-
versy, see discussion infra text accompanying notes 84–96. 
 10. See Schiff, supra note 9 (exposing antiabortion activists’ misappropriation of Susan B. 
Anthony, decrying “the treacherous province of cutting and pasting, of history plucked from both 
text and time,” and describing how with “Photoshopping,” and “slicing and dicing, an argument can 
be made for anything”). 
 11. Suzanne Schnittman, Elizabeth Cady Stanton: Feminist, Wife and Mother of Seven, AM. 
FEM. Fall 2003–Winter 2004, at 24, available at http://www.feministsforlife.org/taf/2003/winter/ 
RewardingMotherhood.pdf. 
 12. Stanton is shown in maternal fashion, in a bonnet, smiling down at her sixth child, two-year 
old Harriot, who is cuddled in her lap. The mug reads, “Another humorless old biddy for life,” and 
includes a quote supposedly from Stanton about the “degrading disposal of children as property,” 
which FFL later admitted could not be verified or attributed to Stanton. For further discussion of the 
questionable existence and meaning of this quote, see infra Part.IV.C. 
 13. Meehan, supra note 3; Foster, supra note 4; Marisa McQuilken, Not Your Mom’s Femi-
nists, LEGAL TIMES, June 19, 2006. Stanton’s maternal image counters the negative image of a “fem-
inist” as antifamily and antichildren, and distinguishes her from other single feminists like Anthony, 
Alice Paul, and, in modern times, Gloria Steinem. 
 14. Foster, supra note 4. 
 15. Foster, supra note 3; see also Why is This Bill Named After Elizabeth Cady Stanton?, 
FEMINISTS FOR LIFE, http://www.feministsforlife.org/ECS/FINAL-ECS150dpi.pdf (last visited Aug. 
20, 2012) (“The mother of the women’s movement celebrated her maternity and challenged the 
culture to accept and support mothering.”). 
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needed to stop the killing of children before and after birth” and that she 
expressed “an uncompromising view that abortion is ‘child-murder.’”16 
Stanton is an important figure in feminist history who was the 
“most prominent and brilliant theorist” of the nineteenth-century wom-
en’s rights movement.17 She is credited with initiating the radical demand 
for women’s suffrage at the First Woman’s Rights Convention in 1848 at 
Seneca Falls, New York.18 Beyond the vote, Stanton demanded equality 
for women within the family, advocating for equal marital partnerships, 
no-fault divorce (especially for victims of domestic violence), marital 
rights to property, and maternal custody of children.19 She appeals to the 
prolife movement as a heroine because she was the married mother of 
seven children who trumpeted her caregiving skills and maternal power. 
What is less known, and likely less appealing to the right-to-life 
movement, is that Stanton also attacked the church and accepted reli-
gious doctrines of women’s subordination. She retranslated the Bible 
from Greek with a feminist lens in an attempt to destroy the entrenched 
gender norms grounded in religion.20 “While her fellow radical Susan B. 
Anthony ultimately focused on women’s suffrage as the way to equality, 
Stanton was concerned with changing cultural infrastructures such as 
religion; family and child-rearing; and American customs, ethics, and 
                                                 
 16. See FFL Bray Brief, supra note 2; FFL Webster Brief, supra note 2. 
 17. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1373, 1417 (2000). See generally SUE DAVIS, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ELIZABETH CADY 
STANTON: WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITIONS (2010); ELLEN CAROL 
DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
IN AMERICA, 1848–1869 (1999); ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, FEMINIST AS THINKER: A READER IN 
DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS (Ellen Carol DuBois & Richard Cándida Smith eds., 2007); LORI D. 
GINZBERG, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: AN AMERICAN LIFE (2009); ELISABETH GRIFFITH, IN HER 
OWN RIGHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON (1985). 
 18. The Declaration of Sentiments detailed a list of “repeated injuries and usurpations on the 
part of man to women,” including the denial of the elective franchise, coverture, denial of marital 
property, the husband’s prerogative of domestic chastisement, the denial of custody of children upon 
separation, taxation without representation, monopolization of all the profitable employments (spe-
cifically theology, medicine, and law), lack of equal opportunity to college education, and denying 
authority and teaching in the Church, and the establishment of separate spheres. THE FIRST 
CONVENTION EVER CALLED TO DISCUSS THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN 2–4 (1848). 
Stanton concluded, “He has endeavored, in every way that he could, to destroy her confidence in her 
own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life.” 
Id. at 4. 
 19. See TRACY A. THOMAS, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND THE FEMINIST FOUNDATIONS OF 
FAMILY LAW (forthcoming N.Y.U. Press); Tracy A. Thomas, Elizabeth Cady Stanton on the Federal 
Marriage Amendment: A Letter to the President, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 137, 138, 140 (2005). 
 20. See generally KATHI KERN, MRS. STANTON’S BIBLE (2001). Stanton’s The Woman’s Bible 
(1898) is considered the first feminist translation of the Bible. Id. at 6.  She led a committee of wom-
en trained in Greek to offer alternative interpretations and commentary on key stories, like the curse 
of Eve and the Pauline doctrines that had been used to subordinate women. Id. 
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social norms.”21 Stanton articulated liberal feminist ideas seeking equal 
treatment and opportunity for women, while also radically demanding an 
end to patriarchy and women’s lack of power in society.22 
To refute the “feminist case against abortion” as attributed to Stan-
ton, this Article proceeds in five parts. Like other works of legal history, 
this Article is fundamentally concerned with recovering all of the legally 
relevant facts and placing those facts in appropriate historical and legal 
context. Part II first details the parameters of the political narrative of 
antiabortion feminists, focusing on the group Feminists for Life, which 
orchestrated this historical strategy. Part III then situates Stanton’s re-
marks and views within the appropriate historical context by tracing the 
development of the nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize abortion. 
The male propaganda of a physicians’ campaign bolstered by sensation-
alist journalism attacked the common law acceptability of abortion be-
fore quickening and employed antifeminist rhetoric about the proper 
place of women in society.23 While a few female voices joined the debate 
to defend women against moral attacks and place the blame for unwanted 
pregnancies instead on men, the larger women’s rights movement fo-
cused on issues of equality and increasingly on the singular issue of suf-
frage.24 
The Article then offers a detailed account of Stanton’s views related 
to abortion discerned from original historical research into the archives 
of Stanton’s papers.25 Stanton did not talk about abortion per se. She did 
not respond to the media deluge about the immorality of abortion or the 
demand for its criminalization. Instead, Stanton engaged on the periphery 
of the debate, trumpeting “voluntary motherhood” and women’s right to 
control procreation, and defending women convicted of infanticide for 
                                                 
 21. Denise M. Marshall, Introduction to ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND 
MORE: REMINISCENCES, 1815–1897, vii (Humanity Books 2002) (1898). 
 22. THOMAS, supra note 19. 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. See infra Part III.B. See generally LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A 
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA (2007); Linda Gordon, Voluntary Motherhood: 
The Beginnings of Feminist Birth Control Ideas in the United States, in MOTHERS & MOTHERHOOD: 
READINGS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 423 (Rima D. Apple & Janet Golden eds., 1997) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Voluntary Motherhood]; Linda Gordon, Why Nineteenth-Century Feminists Did Not Sup-
port “Birth Control” and Twentieth-Century Feminists Do: Feminism, Reproduction, and the Fami-
ly, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 40–41 (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn 
Yalom eds., 1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Nineteenth-Century Feminists]; Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning 
from the Body: An Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protec-
tion, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 282 (1992). 
 25. See THE PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY (Patricia G. 
Holland & Ann D. Gordon eds., Microfilm ed. 1991). 
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the murder of their infants after birth.26 Part IV explores Stanton’s en-
dorsement of the voluntary motherhood ideology and her argument that a 
woman should be the “sovereign of her own person” with the right to 
unilateral choice and control of childbearing. She expanded this idea into 
the notion of “enlightened motherhood,” convincing women of their ob-
ligation to have intentional and healthy pregnancies to avoid physical and 
mental impairments in their children. This enlightened motherhood theo-
ry directly challenged the propaganda of the nineteenth-century abortion 
campaign telling women (white, Protestant women) that it was their duty 
to bear multiple children to preserve the human race. 
Part V then details how Stanton reframed the discourse around 
abortion to turn the public’s attention to her priority of exposing wom-
en’s subordination in law and society.27 She defended women pushed to 
the extreme crime of infanticide, taking up the public defense of one 
young immigrant girl, Hester Vaughn, sentenced to die for the murder of 
her infant. Stanton used the topic of infanticide to expose the gender bias 
of the jury and legal system that excluded women’s participation. She 
demanded a woman’s right to a “jury of her peers” that could appreciate 
the mitigating circumstances of infanticide rather than condemn a wom-
an to death. Part VI then challenges the remaining historical evidence 
from Stanton’s women’s rights newspaper, the Revolution, used by pro-
life advocates to allege Stanton’s antiabortion position.28 It argues that 
these anonymous writings are likely attributed to someone other than 
Stanton and that, in any case, they advocated for solutions other than the 
criminalization of abortion. 
The Article concludes by examining the claim that Stanton and 
modern prolife advocates share common ground on abortion. While such 
claims of common ground are prevalent in contemporary political dia-
logue, they obscure the reality that Stanton never embraced the solution 
that prolife advocates seek—the regulation of abortion. To the contrary, 
Stanton demanded a woman’s right as “sovereign of her own person” 
and the right to control and determine motherhood for herself. She 
sought to obtain a woman’s individual right to procreation, uncontrolled 
by men or an oppressive legal system.29 Given Stanton’s philosophies, 
                                                 
 26. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 27. See infra Part V. 
 28. See infra Part VI. 
 29. GORDON, supra note 24, at 65 (noting that Stanton “sympathized with women who had 
abortions and used the abortion problem as an example of women being victimized by the laws made 
without their consent”). 
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she seems to be an inappropriate figurehead for a modern antiabortion 
movement committed to opposite ends. 
II. FEMINISTS FOR LIFE: OXYMORON OR HISTORICAL TRUTH? 
The prolife movement has woven a convincing story about the al-
leged historical opposition of women’s rights leaders to abortion. This 
strategy of creating a narrative of feminist history against abortion seems 
to have originated in the early 1990s with the antiabortion lobbying 
group, Feminists for Life (FFL). And the conservative political move-
ment quickly embraced it.30 For example, Sarah Palin, former Republi-
can vice-presidential candidate, claimed that “[t]he founders of the 
American women’s movement did not think abortion was good for wom-
en. Quite the contrary, they saw the rights of the unborn as fundamental-
ly linked to the rights of women.”31 
Legislators also used the narrative to bolster political and popular 
support for antiabortion legislation. While speaking in support of the 
federal Partial Birth Abortion Act banning late-term abortions, Repre-
sentative Mike Pence (R-Ind.) said that “[l]ike Susan B. Anthony, her 
friend, who also appears on that extraordinary monument in the Rotunda, 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton was pro-life, and unapologetically so.”32 Repre-
sentative Trent Franks sponsored the “Susan B. Anthony and Frederick 
Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act” in 2011 purporting to prohibit 
abortions as a remedy for sex and race discrimination.33 Scholars too re-
                                                 
 30. See PRO-LIFE FEMINISM: DIFFERENT VOICES (Gail Grenier-Sweet ed., 1985); MAN’S 
INHUMANITY TO WOMAN MAKES COUNTLESS INFANTS DIE: THE EARLY FEMINIST CASE AGAINST 
ABORTION (Mary Krane Derr ed., 1991) [hereinafter MAN’S INHUMANITY]. 
 31. SARAH PALIN, AMERICA BY HEART: REFLECTIONS ON FAMILY, FAITH, AND FLAG 171 
(2010); see Gordon & Sherr, supra note 9 (discussing Palin’s address to the Susan B. Anthony List, 
in which she claimed that her opposition to abortion was rooted in our “feminist foremothers”); On 
the Record with Greta Van Susteren (Fox News television broadcast Nov. 10, 2008) (interviewing 
Palin, who stated that she “subscribed to Feminists for Life” and that the organization represented 
her beliefs). 
 32. 32 CONG. REC. H9802 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003). 
 33. H.R. 3541, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). Opponents of the bill were outraged at the bill’s 
exploitation of civil rights to “advance an anti-choice agenda.” Nancy Keenan, NARAL President, 
Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011 (H.R.3541), An 
Attack on the Reproductive Rights of Women of Color (2011), NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. (Dec. 6, 
2011), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/hr3541-testimony.pdf. The proposed 
legislation asserted that many abortions in the United States are engaged in for “sex-selective pur-
poses” because parents do not desire female children, and that the law thus prohibits “gender vio-
lence.” H.R. 3541, supra, § 2(A)(1), B(1). It also claimed that many other abortions are race-based 
because abortion is prevalent in the black community, and thus claimed to end race discrimination 
through restrictions on abortion, increasing members of the minority community. Id. The Anthony–
Douglass legislation was intended to “protect African-American women from themselves—by mak-
ing it harder for them to have abortions.” Id. The bill created civil remedies available to the father or 
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peated the stories of antiabortion feminist leaders, often without critical 
examination.34 
This popular political narrative often centers on Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton. In 2005, Senator Elizabeth Dole introduced federal legislation to 
provide federal funds to enable young women to continue pregnancies 
and named it “The Elizabeth Cady Stanton Pregnant and Parenting Stu-
dent Services Act.”35 The Stanton Act became law as part of the 2010 
health-care reform bill and provides federal funds for schools to offer 
pregnancy support services like housing, health care, baby formula, and 
counseling.36 The law incorporates a narrative now familiar to popular 
and political audiences in which heroines of the women’s rights move-
ment are “outspokenly” against abortion.37 
A. The Antiabortion Feminists 
Feminists for Life invented the historical women strategy to ad-
vance its political lobbying efforts against abortion. The group’s slogans 
of “Question Abortion,” and “Refuse to Choose. Women Deserve Better 
than Abortion,” highlight its mission of opposing abortion and providing 
alternatives for women to continue unplanned pregnancies.38 FFL be-
lieves that abortion is a reflection that society has failed to meet the 
needs of women and that eliminating legal abortion is the solution to 
forcing society to address the discriminatory economic and educational 
                                                                                                             
maternal grandparent against the woman who engages in the abortion. 18 U.S.C. § 250. The Gover-
nor of Arizona signed a state law to the same effect in April 2011. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3603.02, 
36-2156 (2011). Franks, who is white, drew on the name of Frederick Douglass, arguing that the 
high abortion rate of black women was “the one glaring exception” in the march toward equality 
beginning with the Civil War. Dana Milbank, Republicans Color the Abortion Debate, WASH. POST, 
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/republicans-color-the-abortion-debate/ 
2011/12/06/gIQAbNvpaO_story.html. Black Congressman John Conyers (D-Mich.) responded: 
“I’ve studied Frederick Douglass more than you. I’ve never heard or read him say anything about 
prenatal nondiscrimination.” Id. The bill failed to pass the House. Jennifer Steinhauer, House Rejects 
Bill to Ban Sex-Selective Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A20. 
 34. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Teresa Stanton Collet (dissenting), in WHAT ROE V. WADE 
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST 
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 187 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2007); see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 4, at 
375; JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY 
111 (1978); JOHN THOMAS NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 
48 (1979); John Keown, Back to the Future of Abortion Law: Roe’s Rejection of America’s History 
and Traditions, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 184–85 (2007). 
 35. S. 1966, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4265, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 36. Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 10211–10214, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 37. See sources cited supra note 13.  
 38. See Oaks, supra note 3, at 178; Serrin M. Foster, Women Deserve Better than Abortion, 
FEMINISTS FOR LIFE (2003), http://www.feministsforlife.org/news/WDBSMF150.pdf. 
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constraints that force women into abortion.39 Criminalizing abortion is 
the “lever for forcing society to eliminate all the constraints on pregnant 
women.”40 FFL believes that abortion is never in a woman’s best interest 
and thus opposes abortion even in cases of rape, incest, birth defects, or 
risk to the life or health of the mother.41 
FFL identifies itself as “feminist” because of its concern with wom-
en’s needs.42 Members employ feminist methodology of “listening to 
women’s voices and taking their experiences seriously.”43 The group’s 
sense of an authentic feminism stems from and reflects traditional gender 
roles in which women’s political, social, and economic productivity is 
based on the bonds with their children and the traits that make them good 
mothers.44 They adopt a cultural feminist ideology that women’s differ-
ent nature and strength in motherhood have been devalued instead of cel-
ebrated and embraced.45 The group thus promotes women’s nurturing 
role. “Its members reject a feminism which is materialistic and narcissis-
tic and embrace a loving, nurturing posture of non-violence in relating to 
all members of the human family—including the unborn.”46 
                                                 
 39. FFL argues that “legal abortion is a cop-out, a ‘quick fix,’ and acquiescence to a sexist 
society.” McClain, supra note 7, at 168. 
 40. Id. at 174. 
 41. Oaks, supra note 3, at 182. 
 42. Mary Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life 
Feminism, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. *6 (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author). “Pro-
life feminism helps to paint abortion opponents as pro-woman and as amenable to the needs of the 
women who pursue higher education or professional careers.” Id. 
 43. Foster, supra note 3. Not all agree that FFL’s interest is “feminist.” See McClain, supra 
note 7, at 170, 176. While there is significant disagreement as to what “feminism” is or should be, it 
is generally defined as “a concern for women combined with an opposition to their subordinate 
status in society.” Tracy A. Thomas & Tracey Jean Boisseau, Law, History, and Feminism, in 
FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY 18 (Tracy A. Thomas & Tracey Jean Boisseau eds., 2011). Feminists 
understand sex discrimination and inequality as issues of power and seek to rectify denials of power, 
equality, and autonomy in law and society. Id. 
 44. Ziegler, supra note 42, at *5. 
 45. McClain, supra note 7, at 161, 170. Cultural feminism “elevates the identifiable gender 
differences of relation and maternity to a level of celebration” and focuses on how “women’s differ-
ent voice—with its concern for human relationships and for the positive values of caring, nurturing, 
empathy, and connection—could find greater expression in the law.” Thomas & Boisseau, supra 
note 43, at 20; MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 27 (2d ed. 
2003). It bases its belief of women’s relational nature on Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice 
(1982), which described the results of her psychological research showing that girls’ relational ap-
proach to resolving moral dilemmas through an ethic of care was undervalued. Thomas & Boisseau, 
supra note 43, at 20. 
 46. FFL Akron Brief, supra note 2. FFL argues not only that “legal abortion is against the best 
interests of women and a reflection of women’s inequality, but also that it is a violent and unac-
ceptable killing of vulnerable, helpless human life, a violence incompatible with feminist princi-
ples.” McClain, supra note 7, at 160. 
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FFL was founded in 1972 in Ohio by Catherine Callaghan, a long-
time professor of linguistics at Ohio State University, and Pat Goltz, a 
homemaker to seven children.47 The women met in a judo club and found 
that they shared the belief that support for abortion was not inherent in 
basic principles of feminism.48 Both were active in the Columbus, Ohio, 
chapter of the National Organization of Women (NOW), but Goltz was 
expelled by the local chapter because of her outspoken opposition to 
abortion.49 At that time, NOW was the leading women’s rights political 
organization nationally and focused its efforts on abortion and the identi-
fication of a woman’s right to bodily autonomy as the primary women’s 
issue.50 Disagreeing with this focus on abortion rights, other women’s 
organizations, including FFL, spun off from NOW.51 
In its early years, FFL was active in the campaign supporting the 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). It worked hard to negate the claim that 
the ERA was pro-abortion.52 Testifying before Congress in 1974, Goltz 
argued the ERA would not expand access to abortion because abortion 
did not promote sex equality in any way.53 She argued that abortion was 
inconsistent with feminist ideology. Abortion, she said, was a concession 
that women did not demand “the right to be treated as equals and to be 
mothers at the same time.”54 
FFL remained a small discussion group, marginalized by the na-
tional right-to-life movement led by the religious, antifeminist moral ma-
jority, until the group’s revival as a political advocacy group in the early 
                                                 
 47. Cindy Osborne, Pat Goltz, Catherine Callaghan, and the Founding of Feminists for Life, in 
PROLIFE FEMINISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, supra note 5, at 219–27. 
 48. Id.; U.S. WOMEN’S INTEREST GROUPS: INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES, 196 (Sarah Slavin ed., 
1995). 
 49. Osborne, supra note 47, at 220–21; Meehan, supra note 3, at 65–68. 
 50. See Friedan, supra note 8, at 38–40. 
 51. For example, the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) was founded in 1969 because 
of opposition to abortion and prioritization of education as a key women’s issue. The Women’s Law 
Fund spun off from WEAL in 1972 as a litigation organization dedicated to pursuing issues of wom-
en’s educational and employment equality in the courts, and its first big case, LaFleur v. Cleveland 
Board of Education, successfully overturned mandatory maternity leave for school teachers. Tracy 
A. Thomas, The Struggle for Gender Equality in the Northern District of Ohio, in JUSTICE AND 
LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF LAKE ERIE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 165 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Alexander eds., 
2012). 
 52. Pat Goltz, Equal Rights (1973), reprinted in PROLIFE FEMINISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, 
supra note 5, at 224. 
 53. Abortion III: Testimony on S. 119 and S. 130 Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Consti-
tutional Amendments, 93d Cong. 108 (1974) (statement of Pat Goltz). 
 54. Id. 
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1990s.55 This was a time of revival for the prolife movement with the 
election of a prochoice President, Bill Clinton, and a majority prochoice 
Congress.56 By then, FFL had relocated to Washington, D.C., updated its 
image, and become more politically active.57 To expand the group’s base, 
the organization “began publicizing a different set of claims, those in-
volving the history of pro-life feminism.”58 Rachel MacNair, then-FFL 
president, explained, “The early feminists made clear that they regarded 
abortion as one of the greatest wrongs against women.”59 
Today, the main agenda of FFL is to “refocus the nation on the rea-
sons women feel pressured into abortion and to promote women-centered 
solutions.”60 These reasons include a lack of financial resources, a lack of 
emotional support, coercion by male partners, and inadequate child sup-
port enforcement.61 The group advocates for pregnancy resource centers, 
“right to know” legislation requiring full disclosure of abortion proce-
dures and complications, regulation of abortion clinics, and other pro-
grams that give women “the rest of the choices.”62 
The organization gained heightened visibility from a glossy website 
and an aggressive advertising campaign to proactively support antiabor-
tion causes and candidates. In 2005, the group drew attention and con-
troversy during the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts because his wife, Jane Sullivan, served as pro bono 
counsel to FFL and sat on its board for many years.63 Hollywood, too, 
has given notoriety to the FFL. The group’s national spokesperson and 
honorary chair is Patricia Heaton, two-time Emmy award-winning ac-
                                                 
 55. Ziegler, supra note 42, at *9; Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Antiabortion 
Moderates after Roe v. Wade, 1973–80, 87 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 571 (2012). 
 56. Ziegler, supra note 42, at *5, *9 (stating that in 1989 FFL had only 2,000 members and a 
budget of $10,000); see also Pamela Reynolds, A Different Voice in the Abortion Debate, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 11, 1989, at 4. 
 57. The group supported passage of the Violence Against Women Act, the Family Medical 
Leave Act, and child support enforcement laws. Osborne, supra note 47, at 222; Rosemary Oelrich 
Bottcher, The Conception and Life of FFL, AM. FEM., 2002, at 3. 
 58. Mary Kane Derr, the president of the Chicago chapter of the FFL, “edited a controversial 
anthology of writings by first-wave feminists” on the subject of abortion. Ziegler, supra note 42; see 
MAN’S INHUMANITY, supra note 30. 
 59. See Ziegler, supra note 42. 
 60. Foster, supra note 38. 
 61. Foster, supra note 4. 
 62. Id.; McClain, supra note 7, at 167; see FFL Bray Brief, supra note 2; FFL Casey Brief, 
supra note 2; FFL Webster Brief, supra note 2; FFL Akron Brief, supra note 2. For more on the 
informed consent litigation in the Akron case, see Tracy A. Thomas, Back to the Future of Abortion 
Regulation in the First Term, 16 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. (forthcoming 2012). 
 63. Meehan, supra note 3; Lynette Clemetson & Robin Toner, Antiabortion Advocacy of Wife 
of Court Nominee Draws Interest, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at A1. 
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tress from Everybody Loves Raymond and The Middle fame.64 As the 
group gained popularity, it refined its political message, honing in on the 
claim of a feminist history against abortion. 
B. “The Feminist Case Against Abortion” 
FFL says that it continues the tradition of early feminists who, for 
two hundred years, opposed abortion.65 The group published a book, 
ProLife Feminism, and a quarterly magazine, The American Feminist 
(formerly Sisterlife), which excerpted phrases from historical women 
leaders and compiled them to show a comprehensive view against abor-
tion.66 FFL’s intent was to bring the weight of “herstory” (the history of 
“her,” or women) to bear on the issue of abortion.67 The group claimed 
that “[d]espite the usual ardor for recovering lost herstory, many con-
temporary prochoice feminists have denied, minimized, or neglected 
feminism’s enduring prolife strain.”68 
Its use of historical evidence is encapsulated in a foundational arti-
cle and speech by FFL president Serrin Foster, The Feminist Case 
Against Abortion.69 Foster argued that certain factions of the women’s 
movement in the 1960s “made a drastic about-face” from the original 
intent of the feminist movement to help women.70 She claimed that “the 
now revered feminists of the nineteenth century were also strongly op-
posed to abortion because of their belief in the worth of all humans.”71 
Foster asserted that the criminal laws against abortion passed in the late 
nineteenth century were the “result of advocacy efforts by feminists who 
worked in an uneasy alliance with the male-dominated medical profes-
sion and the mainstream media.”72 The early feminists understood, she 
claimed, “that, much like today, women resorted to abortion because 
they were abandoned or pressured by boyfriends, husbands and parents 
and lacked financial resources to have a baby on their own.”73 Foster said 
that she heard “the diverse voices of our feminist foremothers telling us 
                                                 
 64. Patricia Heaton, Rewarding Motherhood, AM. FEM., Fall 2003–Winter 2004, at 3. 
 65. Foster, supra note 38. 
 66. See also MAN’S INHUMANITY, supra note 30. 
 67. PROLIFE FEMINISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, supra note 5, at 17. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Foster, supra note 4. 
 70. Id.; see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 4, at 387 (“In short, until quite recently, most femi-
nists were strong opponents of abortion, and the farther back one goes in time the more nearly unan-
imous feminists become in their hostility to abortion.”). 
 71. Foster, supra note 4. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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that abortion is a violent and unacceptable alternative to the problem of 
crisis pregnancy.”74 
This historical advocacy extends beyond political lobbying into rep-
resentations made to the U.S. Supreme Court in amicus briefs filed in 
support of legal regulation of abortion.75 In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s 
Health Clinic, FFL supported antiabortion protesters violently blockad-
ing an abortion clinic.76 The organization argued there was a longstand-
ing feminist position against abortion: “The testimony of these women—
including Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Victoria Woodhull, and Matilda 
Gage—reveal . . . an uncompromising view that abortion is ‘ante-natal 
murder,’ ‘child-murder,’ or ‘ante-natal infanticide.’”77 “Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton,” they claimed, “clearly argued that the liberation of women was 
needed to stop the killing of children before and after birth.”78 
Feminists for Life acknowledged that its historical approach had 
not gone unchallenged: “To our sadness and frustration, the assumption 
that we deceptively, manipulatively wrench early feminists’ words out of 
context to impose an ‘ultra rightwing’ agenda still thwarts dialogue and 
cooperative action.”79 This was a response to a 1990 accusation by a 
former vice-president of the FFL who expressed concern about the or-
ganization’s misuse of history.80 The former officer stated, “I really wish 
my former colleagues would stop twisting the words of dead people to 
make them mean something they don’t.”81 She said the quotes attributed 
to early leaders of the women’s movement are “often used by FFLA and 
the rest of the anti-choice movement in a way which does not explain 
their background. The early leaders of the women’s movement were not 
against women controlling their bodies.”82 
As FFL gained more popularity and media attention, it admitted 
that its “pro-life feminist legacy has met with increasing suspicion and 
skepticism.”83 The issue reemerged when the group was accused of “hi-
jacking America’s leading suffragist, Susan B. Anthony.”84 Media atten-
tion in 2010 questioned the use of Anthony’s name for the political lob-
                                                 
 74. PROLIFE FEMINISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, supra note 5, at 183. 
 75. See FFL Bray Brief, supra note 2; FFL Webster Brief, supra note 2. 
 76. FFL Bray Brief, supra note 2. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Annette L. Ravinsky, Letter to Editors, DAUGHTERS OF SARAH 28–29, Nov.–Dec. 1990. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Cat Clark, The Truth About Susan B. Anthony: Did One of America’s First Feminists Op-
pose Abortion?, AM. FEM., 2007, at 1. 
 84. Id. 
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bying organization, the “Susan B. Anthony List.”85 The Susan B. Antho-
ny List is a political, fundraising group founded in 1992 that supports 
prolife candidates, providing a counter to Emily’s List, a political action 
committee that funds feminist, prochoice candidates.86 The group says it 
is named after Anthony because she was “a trailblazer during her time 
for the rights of women and the unborn.”87 
Scholars of Anthony’s life and work have strongly refuted the claim 
that there is any evidence proving Anthony supported abortion.88 As they 
sarcastically noted, “naming this lobby for Susan B. Anthony doesn’t 
change her views any more than clicking your heels three times gets you 
back to Kansas.”89 These historians concluded that “Anthony spent no 
time on the politics of abortion. It was of no interest to her despite living 
in a society (and a family) where women aborted unwanted pregnan-
cies.”90 They explained that one key quote commonly relied upon by 
FFL and written by the anonymous author “A,” was not actually the 
work of Anthony, who instead signed her contributions to the newspaper 
“SBA,” and that in any case, the writer vigorously opposes criminaliza-
tion of abortion.91 The scholars also point out that a second quote relied 
                                                 
 85. Marjorie Dannenfelser, President of the Susan B. Anthony List, Susan B. Anthony: Pro-
Life Feminist, WASH. POST (May 29, 2010), http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/ 
guestvoices/2010/05/susan_b_anthony_pro-life_feminist.html. 
 86. Our History, SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, http://www.sba-list.org/about-sba-list/our-history 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2012). The Susan B. Anthony List boasts 330,000 members and says it has 
helped elect over 90 members of Congress. Campaign for Life 2012 Gala, SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, 
http://www.sba-list.org/suzy-b-blog/campaign-life-2012-gala (last visited Sept. 6, 2012). 
 87. Meet Past Young Leader Awardees, SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, http://www.sba-
list.org/node/2604 (last visited Aug. 21, 2012). 
 88. Gordon & Sherr, supra note 9; Schiff, supra note 9; Stansell, supra note 9; Letter from Ann 
D. Gordon, Research Professor, Rutgers University to author (Oct. 12, 2007) (on file with author). 
Ann Gordon is the archivist and editor of the forty-five microfilm reels and five volumes of The 
Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, supra note 25. Lynn Sherr is author of 
Failure is Impossible: Susan B. Anthony in Her Own Words (1996). Both historians are featured in 
Ken Burns’s PBS documentary of the women’s suffrage movement, Not for Ourselves Alone: The 
Story of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony (1999). 
 89. Gordon & Sherr, supra note 9. 
 90. Only one Anthony source hints at abortion. See Diary of Susan B. Anthony (Mar. 4, 7, 
1876), in THE PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY, supra note 25. 
“After a visit with her brother, Anthony remarks in her diary that her sister-in-law aborted a preg-
nancy, things did not go well, and the woman was bedridden. Anthony concludes, ‘She will rue the 
day she forces nature.’” Gordon & Sherr, supra note 9. 
 91. Gordon & Sherr, supra note 9; see A., Marriage and Maternity, REVOLUTION, July 8, 
1869. The writer “A” responds to an article from the New York Medical Gazette blaming women’s 
love of luxury and shirking of moral duty of motherhood as cause of the crime of abortion and de-
manding legal reform. A., supra. “A” argues against this demand for legal regulation of women, 
calling for prevention rather than punishment of abortion through voluntary motherhood and re-
straint of men. “All articles on this subject that I have read have been from men. They denounce 
women alone as guilty, and never include men in any plans proposed for the remedy of the evil.” Id. 
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on by FFL, when read in context, clearly does not concern abortion, but 
rather addresses the inequity in the law of estates and guardianship that 
permitted fathers to transfer legal guardianship of children to a third par-
ty at death against the wishes of the mother.92 
In response to this scholarly critique, FFL qualified its previous 
reverential support for Anthony’s position in an article, The Truth About 
Susan B. Anthony: Did One of America’s First Feminists Oppose Abor-
tion?, published in the organization’s magazine and on its website.93 
They accepted some of the scholarly conclusions in light of historical 
evidence and admitted, “abortion was not an issue to which Anthony de-
voted much time.”94 The article included a disclaimer intended to down-
play the importance of history to the organization: “While we would be 
pro-life feminists whether or not Susan B. Anthony and the other early 
American feminists opposed abortion, we are proud to continue their 
legacy. By giving birth to new solutions, Feminists for Life builds on the 
foundation they created.”95 The organization still sells coffee mugs with 
Anthony’s image and the misappropriated quote emblazoned on the side. 
It bought and now runs the Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum.96 And 
it continues to use a created feminist history as a lynchpin in its antiabor-
tion advocacy as a time-tested approach that has a popular appeal to both 
legal and political audiences. 
C. The Elizabeth Cady Stanton Pregnant and Parenting  
Student Services Act 
In 2005, FFL proposed language for federal antiabortion legislation 
to provide resources and support for pregnant college women. The ra-
tionale behind this legislation was “to help women who are pregnant get 
the assistance they need so they do not feel that abortion is the only an-
swer.”97 The bill was entitled the “Elizabeth Cady Stanton Pregnant and 
                                                 
 92. Gordon & Sherr, supra note 9; Letter from Ann Gordon to author, supra note 88; See Let-
ter from Susan B. Anthony to Frances Willard, 1869 (“Sweeter even than to have had the joy of 
caring for children of my own has it been to me to help bring about a better state of things for moth-
ers generally, so their unborn little ones could not be willed away from them.”). 
 93. See Clark, supra note 83. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Cat Clark, Did Elizabeth Cady Stanton Say That? (2011) (quoting Serrin Foster, FFL presi-
dent), available at http://www.feministsforlife.org/history/ecs.htm. 
 96. Serrin M. Foster, Susan B. Anthony Was Born Here, AM. FEM., 2010, at 19, available at 
http://www.feministsforlife.org/taf/2011/FFL_TAF_MarchForth.pdf. 
 97. E. Ashley Wright, House of Representatives Passes Hart Amendment with 22-Vote Margin, 
CAL. AGGIE, Apr. 7, 2006 (quoting FFL president Serrin Foster). Foster said in another interview 
that “[i]t is not a debate about abortion—it is about the rest of the choices when having children.” 
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Parenting Student Services Act.”98 Its supporters explained that the bill is 
named after Elizabeth Cady Stanton because “[t]he early feminists were 
pro-life . . . . Because like the philosophy of FFL, they felt if women 
were turning to abortion, there was a larger need that needed to be ad-
dressed.”99 
The Stanton Act was sponsored and first introduced by Senator 
Elizabeth Dole (R-N.C.) in the Senate100 and Representative Melissa Hart 
(R-Pa.) in the House.101 The congressional briefing on the bills by Femi-
nist for Life was orchestrated for February 15, 2006, Susan B. Anthony’s 
birthday.102 The Stanton bills were reintroduced in 2007 as “common 
ground legislation” with bipartisan support, though the most strident an-
tiabortion advocates were among the sponsors.103 The House bill stated 
that “[i]t is the sense of Congress that pregnant college students should 
not have to make a choice between keeping their baby and staying in 
school.”104 The Act proposed to give federal grants to colleges to estab-
lish student-service offices for students who were pregnant, parenting, or 
adopting.105 The funds were intended to allow colleges to make program 
assessments and to meet the needs of students for maternity health-care 
coverage, family housing, childcare, flexible academic schedules, parent-
ing education, material needs of children, and postpartum counseling and 
support.106 Critics cast the Stanton Act as one that encourages the “disas-
                                                                                                             
Lauren Moyer, House Bill Would Aid Students With Children, DAILY COLONIAL (Feb. 2, 2006), 
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May 17, 2006); 152 CONG. REC. S124-02 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2006). 
 104. S. 915, § 2(1). See Elizabeth F. Farrell, A Pregnant Cause: Student Mothers Say Some 
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 105. S. 1966; H.R. 4265; 151 CONG. REC. S12,447-02 (daily ed. Nov. 7 2005). 
 106. H.R. 4265, § 7(1), (2)(A–G); see U.S. Briefing on ECS Pregnant and Parenting Students 
Support Act, FEMINISTS FOR LIFE (Feb. 15, 2006), http://www.womendeservebetter. 
com/ECS/ECS%20briefing%20transcript%20021506.htm; see also Pregnant and Parenting Student 
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Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 500 (S.B. 72)) (sponsored by FFL). 
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ter” of teenage pregnancy by “offering financial rewards to pregnant 
teens.”107 
The core tenets of the Stanton Act became law as part of the health-
care reform legislation. The grants for pregnant students were proposed 
again as a “common ground provision” that made its way into the final 
Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act.108 Championed by 
the stridently antiabortion senator from Pennsylvania, Robert Casey, and 
supported by Democrats for Life, the provision was intended “as an ef-
fort to reduce the demand for abortion.”109 
In July 2010, the Obama Administration quietly announced the 
availability of the Pregnancy Assistance Funds for Pregnant and Parent-
ing Students.110 These are competitive state project grants from the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, Office of Public Health and 
Office of Adolescent Health.111 The grants provide $25 million per year 
from 2010 until 2019 to help states develop and implement “activities to 
assist pregnant teens and women who have made the decision to carry 
their pregnancies to term.”112 Funds can be used to perform needs as-
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sessments on campuses, which are then encouraged to link with existing 
public and private “culturally competent” service providers.113 Support-
ive services envisioned under the grants include health care, housing, 
childcare, telecommuting programs, and practical assistance like mater-
nity and baby clothing, food (including formula), and furniture.114 The 
schools will also be required to “provide referrals for prenatal care and 
delivery, infant or foster care, or adoption, to a student who requests such 
information.”115 
FFL was optimistic that these practical solutions signaled a new ap-
proach to the abortion debate: 
For almost thirty-three years, one side in the polarized abortion de-
bate has asked “What about the woman?” The other has asked 
“What about the baby?” The Elizabeth Cady Stanton Pregnant and 
Parenting Students Act of 2005 holds the answer to both questions: 
working together to address the unmet needs of women. A peaceful 
revolution on campuses has begun.116 
Stanton emerged from historical obscurity to lead the way for the modern 
prolife movement. This re-creation of history, however, misrepresents 
the meaning of Stanton’s words and ignores the relevant historical con-
text. 
III. ABORTION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
To understand Stanton’s words used today by antiabortion advo-
cates, it is important first to appreciate the historical context in which 
they were made. Abortion was not a part of Stanton’s agenda or a focus 
of the nineteenth-century “woman’s rights” platform. During the early 
stages of the women’s rights movement initiated in 1848, abortion in the 
first half of pregnancy was permissible.117 During the second half of the 
century, legislators, spurred by lobbying from the medical establishment, 
began to take action to criminalize abortion.118 Male physicians, deter-
mined to secure their profession against female midwives and to control 
                                                 
 113. As the creator of the program, FFL offers assistance to state offices and universities in 
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what they increasingly believed was the wrongful practice of abortion by 
women, developed a public campaign against abortion and worked care-
fully with legislatures to criminalize abortion in every state by the end of 
the nineteenth century.119 Leading newspapers facilitated political oppo-
sition to abortion through sensational accounts of women who died from 
abortions and the prosecution of the doctors who caused their deaths.120 
The campaign evolved into an attack on women, who were accused of 
selfishly seeking economic and social luxuries while shirking their ma-
ternal duty.121 These increasingly misogynistic appeals drew in a few 
feminist voices that diverted the blame to men for their sexual aggres-
sions, betraying allegiances, and exclusion of women from the public 
spheres of power.122 
A. The Male Campaign Against Abortion 
At common law, abortion was legal until the time of quickening—
the time when a woman first felt fetal movements, usually late in the 
fourth month of pregnancy.123 Quickening served as the legal dividing 
line between acceptable behavior and criminality, as abortions after 
quickening were punished as a crime.124 Popular home manuals gave ex-
plicit details of procedures that might release “obstructed menses” or 
cure an “unnatural blockage” and listed specified herbs, medicines, and 
activities to avoid during pregnancy.125 Women and their physicians thus 
felt justified in restoring the “natural” return of menses.126 This quicken-
ing “distinction was virtually universal in America during the early dec-
ades of the nineteenth century and accepted in good faith,” and abortion 
“was neither morally nor legally wrong in the eyes of the vast majority of 
Americans.”127 Abortion was a socially accepted, if underground, prac-
tice. 
                                                 
 119. See infra text accompanying notes 135–43.  
 120. See infra text accompanying notes 155–60, 171. 
 121. See infra text accompanying notes 149–54. 
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 123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973); MOHR, supra note 34, at 3, 6. 
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The first wave of abortion regulation intended to change this status 
quo began in a handful of states in the 1820s as part of the general codi-
fication movement. The earliest laws in Connecticut, Missouri, and Illi-
nois were poison-control measures concerned with preventing the deaths 
of pregnant women due to abortion herbs and drugs.128 By 1841, ten of 
twenty-six states had passed an abortion statute.129 This early legislation 
continued to focus on medical malpractice and protection of the life and 
health of the mother from the consequences of abortion.130 Most of these 
statutes codified the common law rule criminalizing later term abortions 
while permitting abortions prior to quickening, though five states prohib-
ited abortion before quickening for the first time.131 Yet, even these laws 
that appeared to prohibit early abortions effectively allowed for contin-
ued abortions before quickening because enforcement of these laws re-
quired the prosecution to “prove pregnancy or prove intent, neither of 
which could be determined without doubt without quickening.”132 James 
Mohr, the historian who has best documented the history of abortion dur-
ing this period, suggests that this result may have been intentional as the 
common law quickening distinction was assumed, and “probably reflect-
ed the continued perception of abortion in the United States as a funda-
mentally marginal practice usually resorted to by women who deserved 
pity and protection rather than criminal liability.”133 
“The years 1850 to 1880 saw abortion emerge as a mass political 
issue in America for the first time. During these years the legality of 
abortion became the focus of a nationwide lobbying effort, of legislative 
debate, and of a spate of new legislation.”134 The lobbying effort to crim-
inalize abortion was spearheaded by the medical profession. In 1859, the 
American Medical Association (AMA) issued a resolution condemning 
                                                 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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abortion as an “unwarrantable destruction of human life.”135 The doctors 
denounced the concept of quickening as medically insignificant and en-
dorsed a pseudoscientific understanding of human development begin-
ning at conception.136 Their propaganda was aimed at discrediting wom-
en’s experiences of pregnancy and quickening, claiming pregnancy as an 
area solely for medical expertise.137 Because quickening was based on 
women’s own bodily sensations, not on medical diagnosis, physicians 
were dependent on female judgment.138 Quickening, the physicians ar-
gued, could not be relied upon as an indicator of fetal life because it did 
not occur at a standard moment.139 “Many women never quicken at all,” 
one writer joked, “though their children are born living.”140 
The physicians’ campaign also had practical motivations. The cam-
paign began when the doctors were attempting to establish their practice 
as a profession and medical school graduates (“regulars”) were trying to 
drive out competing popular practitioners (“irregulars”), including mid-
wives and homeopathic medical reformers.141 In particular, the male ob-
stetricians and gynecologists who led the mid-century campaign against 
abortion “were seeking to appropriate management of the birthing pro-
cess from midwives, and to prevent women from entering the medical 
profession.”142 The physicians’ antiabortion tracts depicted abortion as a 
“female crime” perpetrated by female midwives, female patients, and 
their female friends, in which the new (male) medical professionals 
would play no part.143 
The public campaign against abortion intensified as the number of 
abortions increased.144 The increase in abortion came primarily from 
white, middle-class, Protestant women who chose abortion as a birth-
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control method, often with the support of their spouses.145 This was a 
significant change in the social character of abortion, which was typical-
ly thought of as an option only for poor, unmarried women who were 
forced by shame and desperate circumstances into action.146 “Now, how-
ever, the exceeding prevalence of the evil is found to be among an entire-
ly different class, and the fruit of legitimate wedlock in every grade of 
society, high and low, but especially the former, is the prey of this de-
stroying Moloch.”147 The use of abortion by women who had other so-
cially acceptable choices outraged the physicians. Their rhetoric was in-
fused with nativist implications in appeals to white Protestant women to 
bear children to counter the rising numbers of immigrants and nonwhite 
children.148 
The “antiabortion campaign was antifeminist at its core.”149 The 
AMA campaign developed the caricature of the married woman who 
willfully aborted pregnancy and rejected the domestic and maternal role 
men had constructed for her.150 The woman who sought an abortion was 
selfish, frivolous, dangerous, and destructive for rejecting her social duty 
to bear children.151 The American Medical Association’s 1871 Report on 
Criminal Abortion denounced the married woman who aborted a preg-
nancy: “She becomes unmindful of the course marked out for her by 
Providence, she overlooks the duties imposed on her by the marriage 
contract. She yields to the pleasures—but shrinks from the pains and re-
sponsibilities of maternity . . . .”152 Horatio Storer, one of the first male 
gynecologists and the leading antiabortion crusader of the AMA wrote 
that “[t]he true wife” does not seek “undue power in public 
life, . . . undue control in domestic affairs, . . . or privileges not her 
own.”153 The AMA campaign succeeded in convincing the public and the 
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politicians that abortion, and women, were a threat to the social order and 
male authority.154 
The physicians’ antiabortion campaign was fueled by the sensation-
alist journalism of leading newspapers. These stories recounted the hor-
rific details of women dying from abortions in squalid conditions or fo-
cused on the notorious millionaire abortionist, Madame Restell.155 The 
New York Times began its campaign for more stringent laws against 
abortion in 1863, recounting the tragic death of Mrs. Elizabeth Hunting-
ton at the hands of Dr. McGonegal and the empanelling of a jury in the 
dying woman’s home to get her deathbed declaration.156 The paper re-
ported sensational cases of the deaths of ten more women who died from 
abortions between 1865 and 1869.157 In 1871, the New York Times ran an 
exposé on abortion entitled The Evil of the Age followed by a sequel, 
Trunk Mystery.158 The Times assigned a reporter, Augustus St. Clair, to 
go undercover for the purpose of visiting well-known abortionists to 
gather materials for an article on the abortionists’ qualifications, practic-
es, and fees. He wrote of the enormous amount of abortion “that exists 
and flourishes, almost unchecked in the City of New York.”159 “Thou-
sands of human beings are thus murdered before they have seen the light 
of this world, and thousands upon thousands more of adults are irremedi-
ably robbed in constitution, health, and happiness.”160 
These practices were fostered by loosely veiled advertisements for 
abortionists and abortifacients that were prevalent in mainstream and 
religious newspapers from 1840 to the mid-1870s.161 A key source of 
revenue for these papers, doctors (and quack doctors like Madame 
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Restell) advertised “female services,” and product advertisements offered 
“French pills” and “Portuguese medicines.”162 Abortion advertisements 
were eventually outlawed by the federal Comstock Law, passed in 1873, 
which prohibited obscenity in documents sent through the mail and de-
fined “obscenity” to include anything related to contraception or repro-
duction.163 Pressures from public opinion and the physicians’ campaign 
spurred state legislators into further legislative action. Laws passed be-
tween 1860 and 1880 criminalized abortion at every stage of pregnancy 
and ultimately made abortion a crime in every state by the end of the 
century.164 
The public shift from acceptance to criminalization of early term 
abortion played out in Stanton’s home state of New York. Beginning in 
1828, the revisers of the New York code expanded the offense of abor-
tion to include abortions prior to quickening and elevated post-
quickening abortion from a misdemeanor to a felony with an exception 
for therapeutic abortions necessary for the health of the mother.165 One 
legal scholar concluded, based on the revisers’ notes, that the law was 
primarily concerned with protecting women from surgical malpractice 
and death from abortion procedures during a time before the invention of 
antiseptic.166 In 1845, the New York legislature enacted a comprehensive 
law to criminalize abortion through medicines or procedures and to pun-
ish the provider of abortions for manslaughter in the second degree.167 
For the first time, this act brought the woman herself under the criminal 
sanctions of the statute rather than punishing only the doctor, midwife, or 
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pharmacist.168 Practically, however, these laws changed nothing because 
they applied to a woman “quick with child” or a “pregnant woman,” and 
thus to enforce the laws it was necessary to prove pregnancy.169 Addi-
tionally, the law required the heightened standard of proof of “intent 
thereby to procure a miscarriage.”170 
Following a “cacophony of sensational and usually fatal abortion 
cases, as reported in the daily press,” the New York legislature was again 
lobbied to protect women from these deaths.171 The Medical Society of 
the State of New York met in Albany on February 5, 1867, and adopted a 
resolution against abortion with three key findings.172 First, it concluded 
that life begins at the moment of conception; second, that the association 
abhorred abortion and intended to “arrest this flagrant corruption of mo-
rality among women, who ought to be and unquestionably are the con-
servators of morals and of virtue”; and third, that newspaper publications 
of “ostensible remedies for female disease that suggest abortion are high-
ly detrimental to public health and morals” and should be forbidden by 
the legislature.173 
Action on the abortion resolution in the legislature was delayed, 
however, because of the debate over black suffrage.174 In 1868, the New 
York legislature banned abortion advertisements in its first anti-obscenity 
statute, which explicitly prohibited the advertising and printing of adver-
tisements for any “article or medicine for the prevention of conception or 
procuring of abortion.”175 The legislature returned to the topic of abortion 
in 1869 and passed a law that made abortion at any time, including prior 
to quickening, illegal and removed the prosecutor’s burden of proving 
pregnancy.176 The increasing fervor of the physician and journalist anti-
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abortion campaign pressured the legislature to revise the abortion law 
again in 1872 to strengthen its prohibitions, increase the penalties, and 
incorporate the ban on abortion advertising.177 New York was at the fore-
front of the movement to criminalize abortion, and the rest of the states 
soon followed by uniformly prohibiting abortion by the century’s end. 
B. Feminist Voices and Voluntary Motherhood 
A few female voices joined in the public fray over abortion, writing 
into Stanton and Anthony’s women’s rights newspaper, the Revolu-
tion.178 They reacted strongly to the attacks on women and to the blame 
of women for the public problem of increasing abortions.179 These fe-
male writers crafted a counternarrative of men’s equal responsibility. 
Using the rhetoric of the abortion campaign, they blamed the men: “This 
crime of ‘child murder,’ ‘abortion,’ ‘infanticide,’ lies at the door of the 
male sex,” wrote Matilda Joslyn Gage.180 Mattie Brinkerhoff wrote of 
“the boldness with which many men blame women for the crime of in-
fanticide without assuming themselves, in the case, a shadow of respon-
sibility.”181 
The women argued for voluntary motherhood and the right of a 
woman to be “the owner of her own body.”182 The following argument 
appeared in the Woman’s Advocate of Dayton, Ohio: 
Till men learn to check their sensualism, and leave their wives free 
to choose their periods of maternity, let us hear no more invectives 
against women for the destruction of prospective unwelcome chil-
dren, whose dispositions, made miserable by unhappy ante-natal 
conditions, would only make their lives a curse to themselves and 
others.183 
Other women agreed that men were at fault and expressed empathy 
for the circumstances of poverty and domestic violence that drove wom-
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en to abortion. One writer doubted that the medical profession’s “educa-
tional” campaign to disabuse women of the scientific truth of quickening 
would make any difference to the prevalence of abortion: 
They do it with the knowledge that it endangers their own lives, but 
the cry is “Liberty or Death”: and could you look upon the wretched 
homes where heartbroken women work day and night, for the most 
shameful pittance to provide food for the little ones whom the brutal 
lusts of a drunken husband have forced upon them, you would not 
wonder that they do not choose to add to their number.184 
She challenged “statesmen and philanthropists” to “abate this evil” by 
instead giving “liberty to women, freedom entire, and the education it is 
sure to bring.”185 The anonymous writer concluded that it was time to 
conspire against the institution of marriage, which “made one human 
being the slave of another.”186 
Scholars have characterized these writings as part of a nineteenth-
century “feminist position on abortion.”187 The feminist position is sum-
marized as calling for a woman’s right to control her own body, empha-
sizing prevention rather than punishment, and placing the blame for 
abortion on men.188 “The first woman’s rights movement was highly 
sympathetic to the reasons why women sought abortions. These feminists 
understood the incidence of abortion to be rooted in women’s lack of 
control over marital intercourse,” leading to desperate acts.189 “They 
blamed the husbands who refused to restrain their sexual demands, rather 
than the wives forced to submit to them.”190 
Nineteenth-century feminists did not, however, affirmatively en-
dorse abortion as their twentieth-century counterparts did.191 These early 
feminists “feared that separating intercourse from reproduction would 
facilitate male infidelity, destabilizing marital relationships on which 
women were enormously dependent, in an environment in which extra-
marital sexuality” was an unattractive option.192 Supporting abortion 
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would also have been “very politically costly for the feminist movement, 
given the medical establishment’s fierce and organized opposition to 
abortion” and given its increasing illegality.193 Feminists were part of a 
general equal rights movement seeking equal respect for women’s social 
and legal rights, and “they needed respect for motherhood and women’s 
work even while women needed freedom from excessive childbear-
ing.”194 
Instead, “feminists found the argument they need to reconcile in-
voluntary pregnancies and equality in the ideal of voluntary mother-
hood.”195 “Voluntary motherhood” was the slogan for the theory that 
wives had the right to unilaterally choose when to engage in sexual rela-
tions with their husband, abstaining periodically or abstaining perma-
nently unless procreation was desired.196 Voluntary motherhood “repre-
sented an initial response to feminists’ understanding that involuntary 
motherhood and child rearing were important parts of women’s oppres-
sion.”197 They understood motherhood as involuntary, analogizing forced 
maternity to prostitution.198 The right to control this involuntary oppres-
sion through a unilateral right of refusal was at the heart of voluntary 
motherhood. “A woman’s right to refuse was the fundamental condition 
of birth control—and of her independence and personal integrity.”199 
Both conservative and radical factions of the women’s rights 
movement agreed on the topic of voluntary motherhood.200 “On no ques-
                                                                                                             
sexual tyranny, embodied in domestic violence, temperance issues, and legal exemptions for marital 
rape, but encouraging licentious behavior by removing the consequences of sexual predation would 
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tion did the feminists agree so clearly as on birth control. The slogan they 
used—‘voluntary motherhood’—was an exact expression of their ideol-
ogy, incorporating both a political critique of the status quo, as involun-
tary motherhood, and a solution.”201 Voluntary motherhood, as the very 
name implies, carried no “antimotherhood implications.”202 The argu-
ment was that “willing mothers would be better mothers.”203 
By the end of the nineteenth century, “[t]he general conviction of 
the women’s rights community that women had a right to choose when to 
be pregnant was . . . strong.”204 Voluntary motherhood established the 
foundational notion of bodily autonomy and philosophy of a woman’s 
individual right to have a choice in procreation that served as precursors 
to the twentieth-century feminist demand for the right to choose an abor-
tion.205 The women’s rights community spoke in terms of a woman’s 
ownership of her own body and emphasized that motherhood should be a 
voluntary choice. These ideas would be fundamental to a modern under-
standing of a constitutional right of privacy that includes a woman’s right 
to choose an abortion.206 Scholars have thus identified the voluntary 
motherhood movement as the first step initiating the modern feminist 
movement for the right to an abortion.207 
IV. ENLIGHTENED MOTHERHOOD 
Stanton endorsed this feminist ideal of voluntary motherhood and 
its later corollary, enlightened motherhood, which extolled the virtues of 
women’s procreative control. As the public debate over abortion de-
manded that women had a social and moral duty to bear children, Stan-
ton countered that women had a duty not to bear children.208 Stanton 
used her national lecture tour and individual caucuses with women to 
teach that women had a right to their own person, their own “woman-
hood.”209 She buttressed this individual rights argument by asserting that 
the good of society would be served not by having many children, but by 
having fewer, “quality” children derived from intentional and healthy 
pregnancies.210 She told women that they should not see their own worth 
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in terms of motherhood, but in terms of their “own womanhood.”211 
Stanton offered a strong voice against the deluge of propaganda from the 
abortion campaign that commanded women to have multiple children as 
dictated by law and their husbands. 
Stanton “understood a woman’s right to control her person as the 
foundational right upon which political and economic equality needed to 
rest if they were to have any value.”212 Based on her experience as the 
mother of seven children, Stanton appreciated the reality that the work of 
raising children fell exclusively on women.213 She thus vividly under-
stood “that women needed to have full control over marital intercourse 
so that they could determine how many children they would raise and 
when.”214 Stanton’s argument about the right of self-ownership was “an 
intensely gender-specific argument about a woman’s particular right.”215 
She knew that bearing and raising children were solely a woman’s obli-
gation and argued that women should therefore solely determine when to 
undertake that responsibility. 
A. The Sovereign of Her Own Person 
Stanton’s speeches and lectures worked to convince women of their 
“right to their own person,” and the “preservation of their own woman-
hood.”216 When asked what she meant by a woman’s right to “owning 
her own body,” Stanton replied, “Womanhood is the primal fact, wife-
hood and motherhood its incidents. . . . Must the heyday of her existence 
by wholly devoted to the one animal function of bearing children? Shall 
there by no limit to this but woman’s capacity to endure the fearful strain 
on her life?”217 Stanton wrote, “How can she [woman] endure our present 
marriage relations by which women’s life, health, and happiness are held 
so cheap that she herself feels that God has given her no charter of rights, 
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no individuality of her own?”218 She called women to action: “Man in his 
lust has regulated long enough this whole question—of sexual inter-
course. Now let the mothers of mankind whose prerogative it is to set 
bounds to his indulgence, raise up [and] give this whole matter a thor-
ough, fearless examination.”219 
For Stanton, the right of a woman to control her own person was 
the foundational right, the starting point for social equality, “the battle-
ground where our independence must be fought and won.”220 She wrote: 
The rights, to vote, to hold property, to speak in public, are all-
important, but there are great social rights, before which all others 
sink into utter insignificance. The cause of woman is . . . not a ques-
tion of meats and drinks, of money or lands, but of human rights—
the sacred right of a woman to her own person, to all her God-given 
powers of body and soul. Did it ever enter into the mind of man that 
woman too had an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
her individual happiness? Did he ever take in the idea that to the 
mother of the race, and to her alone, belonged the right to say when 
a new being should be brought into the world?221 
“Stanton’s understanding of a married woman’s right to her person was 
shared throughout the woman’s rights movement.”222 There was a shared 
appreciation that because of women’s “exclusive responsibility for child 
rearing,” women “were entitled to control the terms of this work and de-
termine how much of their lives they would have to spend raising chil-
dren.”223 
For Stanton, the concept of voluntary motherhood was so central 
that on her lecture tours “she held separate afternoon meetings for wom-
en only (an unfamiliar practice at that time) and talked ‘the gospel of 
fewer children [and] a healthy, happy maternity.”224 She wrote: “What 
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radical thoughts I then and there put into their heads [and] as they feel 
untrammeled, these thoughts are permanently lodged there! That is all I 
ask.”225 At a lecture in San Francisco, she relayed her experience in 
speaking with the polygamist Mormon women in Utah. She reported: 
Women are there treated in that matter just as they are treated else-
where—without regard to their nature and their rights. Girls of 15 to 
17, whose girlhood has not yet ripened, are wives and bear children 
every year. Everywhere it is so, and none the less so in Utah.226 
She offered the same solution for all women. “We must educate our 
daughters, . . . First—to regard their own lives and bodies and the laws 
which govern them.”227 
In her lectures, Stanton encouraged women not to have children. 
She argued that “the preservation of their own womanhood was the one 
prime object of their lives.”228 Instead, she said, “[A]s it is now, we look 
up to wives and mothers, and down on womanhood. This is wrong.”229 
Stanton said she revered single women like “Susan B. Anthony and Har-
riet Hosmer230 who have done great things in the world despite not hav-
ing borne children.”231 She continued, “[w]e must educate our girls that 
they are independent; that in the society of the refined they may be hap-
py; that they may live peaceful, glorious lives, and take high seats in 
Heaven, without ever seeing a man.”232 
In San Francisco, women in the audience questioned the practical 
realities of Stanton’s suggestion.233 As reported in the newspaper The 
Chronicle (allegedly by a male journalist who claimed to slip into the 
lecture dressed as a woman), one woman asked, “How can we follow 
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your advice and keep from having children?”234 Stanton answered, 
“Woman’s perfect independence is the answer to the query. Woman 
must at all times be the sovereign of her own person.”235 A second wom-
an asked, “What do we do when men don’t agree with us?”236 Stanton 
replied that men can be educated as to voluntary motherhood, that their 
passions can be controlled, and that women should stop stimulating 
men’s passions with dress, dance, and fashion with bare arms and bare 
necks.237 The Chronicle reported that “[o]ne lady asked a question which 
hinted at prevention by other than legitimate means.”238 The journalist 
wrote that “Mrs. Stanton promptly replied that such views of the matter 
were too degrading and disgusting to touch upon, and must be classified 
in the category of crime alongside infanticide.”239 Stanton’s solution was 
abstinence, which followed the core principles of the voluntary mother-
hood movement and its emphasis on women’s control of sexual relations. 
B. “Lions Not Jackasses” 
Stanton extended her advocacy of voluntary motherhood into the 
idea of “enlightened motherhood.” Enlightened motherhood added a se-
cond argument about the eugenic consequences of unwanted pregnancies 
to the rhetoric of individual rights. It articulated a concern for the greater 
human race by controlling pregnancy to produce fewer children, but 
children of “superior quality.”240 Stanton emphasized the impact of un-
wanted and unhealthy pregnancies on the mental and physical health of 
the child, arguing that women should aim “to have one good kind of 
child” rather than many, and should try to produce “lions not jackass-
es.”241 
“This concern with eugenics was characteristic of nearly all femi-
nists of the late nineteenth century.”242 Feminists used eugenic arguments 
to bolster their credibility and “conquer conservative and religious scru-
ples about reproduction.”243 Women had been told in the abortion cam-
paign that their duty to the human race and the greater good was to pro-
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duce multiple children. Feminists now used this rhetoric about the great-
er good of the human race to find a benefit from women’s restriction of 
procreation. The newly articulated eugenics theory provided a scientific 
basis for that argument. 
The early eugenists like Stanton focused on individual improve-
ments in environment that could be transmitted to offspring, such as im-
proving the physical and mental conditions of the mother during preg-
nancy.244 At the time, eugenics was an implication of evolutionary theo-
ry, used by many social reformers to buttress their arguments that im-
provement of the human condition was possible.245 As it developed, eu-
genics added a fear about the decline of the white race from social, polit-
ical, and economic threats from an expanding class of immigrants, a na-
tivist and racist theory that featured prominently in the antiabortion liter-
ature. Later in the twentieth century, eugenics would take on a more in-
vidious focus, but the thought “originally was primarily directed at the 
elimination of idiocy, criminality, and drunkenness” on the theory that 
such undesirable qualities were hereditary.246 “Feminists assumed the 
inheritability of acquired characteristics and contended that a husband’s 
licentiousness and a wife’s unhappiness about her impending maternity 
would be transmitted to their child before birth, forever diminishing the 
child’s capabilities and prospects.”247 
Stanton was particularly concerned about unwanted pregnancies 
from alcoholic fathers. She was influenced here by her early work on and 
support of the temperance movement that pushed for the prohibition of 
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alcohol. As a housewife in Seneca Falls, Stanton’s neighbors and house-
hold employees often confided in her, as a de facto lawyer, about domes-
tic abuse, unwanted pregnancies, and other indignities from drunken 
husbands.248 Stanton drew on these experiences in her remarks on con-
trolling childbirth. She warned women against having children with an 
alcoholic husband: “[L]ive with him as a friend, . . . but for woman’s 
sake, for humanity’s sake, be not his wife—bring no children to that 
blighted, dreary, desolate hearth.”249 At other times she argued more stri-
dently, sarcastically calling for the legislature to command such a result: 
“Let them fine a woman fifty dollars for every child she conceive by a 
Drunkard. Women have no right to saddle the state with idiots to be sup-
ported by the public. Only look at the statistics of the idiot asylums, near-
ly all the offspring of Drunkards.”250 
C. Sparring with Mrs. Stanton 
This time period of enlightened motherhood gave rise to one quote 
alleged to have come from Stanton and prominently featured by modern 
prolife advocates. The quote reads, “When we consider that women are 
treated as property, it is degrading to women that we should treat our 
children as property to be disposed of as we see fit.”251 For many years, 
this quote was the centerpiece of FFL propaganda showcased on posters, 
brochures, and coffee mugs. FFL members embroidered the quote on a 
quilt and donated it to the Seneca Falls Historical Society.252 However, 
the anonymous quote has not been proven to be Stanton’s—or even to 
exist. 
At first blush, the content of the FFL quote recalls something Stan-
ton once said early in her career attacking the “disposal of children as 
property” through the laws of guardianship and indentured servitude. In 
her 1854 Address to the Albany Legislature, Stanton wrote, “[B]y your 
laws, the child is the absolute property of the father, wholly at his dis-
posal in life or at death.”253 In her multilayered attack on coverture, Stan-
ton criticized the custody laws under which mothers were powerless to 
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stop the indentured servitude of their children and to prevent the “bind-
ing out” of their children to third-party guardians.254 She decried the 
“abuse of absolute power” by which a father could bind his daughter to 
the owner of a brothel, or apprentice his child to a trade or labor “without 
the mother’s consent—yea, in direct opposition to her most earnest en-
treaties, her prayers and tears.”255 The FFL quote hints at a similar focus 
on guardianship, but review of the complete source is required. 
However, attempts to locate and verify the source of this alleged 
Stanton quote have been unavailing. FFL and other scholars cite the 
source for the quote as a “letter to Julia Ward Howe, October 16, 1873, 
recorded in Howe’s diary at Harvard University Library.”256 While Howe 
was a contemporary of Stanton’s and a supporter of suffrage, she was 
also a leader in the rival conservative women’s rights organization.257 A 
search of the archives by Harvard librarians, this author, and a second 
researcher could not locate the source. An inquiry to the Feminists for 
Life went unanswered.258 Several months after the inquiry, FFL stopped 
using the Stanton quote and removed all posters and mugs with the quote 
from its website. The group issued this disclaimer: “Though we have 
been searching for it and continue to seek it, Feminists for Life has, un-
fortunately, not been able to locate this letter attributed to Stanton.”259 
They offered an explanation: “The letter may never have been written, or 
it may have been misplaced, relocated, stolen, or destroyed.”260 And the 
group agreed to stop using the quote. “Until we can verify that Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton wrote the words, we will no longer attribute them to 
her.”261 
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What Howe’s diary does reveal, however, is that she and the radical 
Stanton disagreed on the topic of infanticide. Howe rejected Stanton’s 
views, which she interpreted as implicitly tolerating the crime of infanti-
cide. Howe wrote that she 
[s]parred with Mrs. Stanton, who excused infanticide on the 
grounds that women did not want to bring moral monsters into the 
world, and said that these acts were regulated by natural law. I dif-
fered from her strongly, asserting that the moral law of man’s being 
was paramount to the mechanical tendencies, quoted as natural 
laws, and that infanticide was usually a crime of gross selfishness, 
though under some circumstances, the struggle against it must be 
agonizing. Nature has a dark horror of the act, I think.262 
That day, October 16, 1873, Howe and Stanton had attended a confer-
ence of Howe’s newly formed First Woman’s Congress of the Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Women in New York City.263 Twelve days 
later, Howe wrote in her diary, “Someone has sent me a Golden Age 
with a dashing notice of the Woman’s Congress, by Mrs. Stanton. As 
might be expected, she slurs me with faint praise, but somewhat sus-
tained my objections to proceedings already characterized in these pag-
es.”264 
Stanton attended the Woman’s Congress to speak on the topic of 
the co-education of the sexes, but on the third day of the meeting, the 
topic turned to enlightened motherhood and the notion that women 
should engage in more deliberate and healthful pregnancies.265 The 
speeches opened with strong condemnation of infant mortality rates, 
pleaded for women to improve their knowledge and physical condition 
during pregnancy, and demanded that men practice sexual self-control so 
that healthier babies were born.266 One speaker, Elizabeth Lovering, 
made what the newspapers called “a tricky case”: 
No child should be brought into the world which was not the prod-
uct of a perfect love, the damage to the race from the birth of chil-
dren, the product of an overburdened and unwilling motherhood, or 
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of an exhausted vitality on the part of either of the parents, was in-
calculable.267 
Stanton responded to this argument during the discussion. She as-
serted that the character of the child was formed before birth, and she 
made eugenics-type arguments against bringing deformed children into 
the world. Stanton said, 
[She] [h]ad often thought, when she inspected the different charita-
ble asylums, what should we say of an artist who should spend all 
day in filling a gallery full of distorted statues and everything 
crooked about them. Yet we have been filling the world with men 
and women with crooked legs and crooked brains and everything 
crooked about them altogether. I want to have women, she said, 
think on these things. They must not take the teaching of men, that 
have taught women their whole duty was to multiply and replenish 
the earth. This was a mistake; we have too many children already. It 
is in vain that Bishop Cox Hopkins talks from the pulpit against the 
crime of infanticide; there are laws deeper down than anything we 
know. Every woman knows we are bringing into the world moral 
monstrosities. When physical monstrosities are born the physician 
thinks it is perfectly just to put them out of the world. Mothers 
know that they are bringing into the world moral monstrosities. It is 
not the right and duty of every man and woman to be fathers and 
mothers, for it is the ante-natal conditions that determine the charac-
ter of the race.268 
Howe quickly attempted to distance herself and the convention from the 
implications of Stanton’s remarks. Howe said that she “was deeply mor-
tified if any sanction of infanticide should go forth from that meeting” 
and that she “was fearful that the impression might go abroad that the 
Woman’s Congress favored infanticide based upon Stanton’s re-
marks.”269 Stanton sarcastically replied that “she had not the least idea 
that the majority of the audience thought that she favored infanticide. She 
had merely stated what was an acknowledged fact in the world and al-
ways would be until women had the full and entire control of their own 
person.”270 Stanton continued to say that if a woman was grand enough 
to bring into the world a dozen children, by all means let her do so (she 
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thought she fell within this category, which justified her deliberate ef-
forts to have seven children).271 But Stanton continued, “[I]f a woman 
with weak, sickly constitution is married to a drunken and profligate 
husband the fewer the children she brings into the world the better.”272 
V. STANTON REFRAMES THE DEBATE AS WOMEN’S OPPRESSION 
Stanton articulated clear views about women’s right to control their 
own person and their singular right to control procreation. As the cam-
paign against abortion swirled around her, Stanton joined in at the pe-
riphery, drawn in by the attack on women. She did not engage with the 
moral question of abortion but instead utilized the public dialogue to re-
frame the question into one of women’s rights. The male-dominated 
abortion debate gave her the toehold she needed to get an audience for 
her radical issues of women’s rights reform. Stanton routinely adopted 
this approach in other contexts as well, taking a topic from the front-page 
headlines and redirecting the public and political discourse to implica-
tions for women’s rights.273 She knew how to capitalize on the media to 
keep her agenda of the “woman question” front and center. 
Stanton focused her attention on the crime of infanticide to expose 
the gender bias of the legal system. Infanticide, the murder of an infant 
after birth, had never been permissible, and was universally condemned. 
Yet Stanton used infanticide, rather than the more morally ambiguous 
issue of abortion (given the common law acceptance of early-term abor-
tion) to illustrate her points about women’s oppression. Contrary to con-
servative claims today, Stanton did not speak expressly about or against 
abortion. Instead, she directed her comments to infanticide, formulating a 
defense of women accused of this crime—mainly in the notable case of 
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Hester Vaughn. Stanton’s defense focused on women’s exclusion from 
participation in making the law and their absence in legislatures and ju-
ries. She argued that women were entitled to a “jury of their peers” and 
the right to equal access to serve on juries in these and other cases. 
Stanton used the platform of her paper, the Revolution, as a vehicle 
to disseminate her views about infanticide. Editorials in the paper, by 
Stanton and others, also form the basis of proof that antiabortion advo-
cates use today to claim that Stanton was “outspokenly” against abortion. 
But the evidence speaks for itself. 
A. Stanton’s “Infanticide and Prostitution” 
In February 1868, Stanton began the weekly edition of the Revolu-
tion with a piece entitled “Infanticide and Prostitution.”274 It began by 
reprinting two blurbs, one from the Sun lamenting the “social evil statis-
tics” of prostitution and one from the Tribune regarding “child mur-
der.”275 The Tribune excerpt attacked the “notorious boarding-house,” 
where “mothers, married or unmarried, can be delivered of their off-
spring in the strictest confidence, and relieved of all the burdens of ma-
ternity.”276 The reprint stated that “the murder of children, either before 
or after birth, has become so frightfully prevalent that physicians, who 
have given careful and intelligent study to the subject, have declared that 
were it not for immigration the white population of the United States 
would actually fall off!”277 The reprint concluded that “the murder of 
infants is a common thing among American women.”278 
Stanton responded to the newspapers’ moral attacks on women by 
focusing on potential remedies to the alleged problems. She asserted, 
“We believe that cause of all these abuses lies in the degradation of 
woman.”279 The only remedy, she said, is “the education and enfran-
chisement of woman.”280 Stanton explained she was not surprised that 
women “do everything to avoid maternity” because maternity is present-
ed religiously as a curse, and women “through ignorance of the science 
of life and health find it so.”281 Stanton placed the blame for unwanted 
pregnancies on men. “Strike the chains from your women; for as long as 
they are slaves to man’s lust, man will be the slave of his own pas-
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sions.”282 She refused to engage in the moral outrage against women. 
“Let us no longer weep, whine and pray over all these abominations.”283 
Instead, she called for an “enlightened conscientiousness” and for “every 
thinking man” to change things in his own household by facilitating in-
tentional and healthful pregnancies.284 
Stanton used the heightened awareness of the public media cam-
paign against abortion to advance her own agenda of exposing the nature 
of women’s oppression and demand for equal rights. She capitalized on 
the existing public rhetoric and media frenzy to reframe the narrative into 
one of women’s rights, focusing on the social causes and public en-
dorsement of women’s oppression. She did not engage in the debate on 
the same moral and sexist terms dictated by the male medical profession 
and press, but instead recast the issue from a feminist perspective to fo-
cus on the issue of women’s subordination under the law. 
B. Defending Hester Vaughn 
For Stanton, the issue of infanticide was not about morality. Rather, 
it was an example of the gendered bias of an unjust legal system. She 
used infanticide as a principal example of how man unjustly made and 
executed laws against woman, explaining that “the one in power fails to 
apply the immutable principles of right to any grade but his own.”285 
Stanton brought the public’s attention to her views on infanticide through 
the pages of the Revolution and a series of features on the trial of Hester 
Vaughn, capitalizing on the media attention on infanticide and abortion 
in 1868.286 
Hester Vaughn was a poor, young English immigrant convicted of 
infanticide by a Philadelphia court and sentenced to be “hanged by the 
neck until she is dead.”287 Vaughn worked as a domestic servant, became 
pregnant either by force or seduction, and was forced out on the 
streets.288 She rented a room in a tenement house run by a German-
speaking family.289 There, in the dead of winter, with no heat or water, 
she gave birth alone; three days later she was found in her room next to 
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the dead infant.290 She was denied the right to testify at her own trial and 
was convicted by an all-male jury.291 The judge later explained that 
Vaughn had “an excellent face,” but that it was important to establish a 
principle, “because you have no idea how rapidly the crime of infanticide 
is increasing. Some woman must be made an example of.”292 
The unsigned editorial that initiated the Revolution’s defense of 
Vaughn described her as a “poor, ignorant, friendless and forlorn girl 
who had killed her newborn child because she knew not what else to do 
with it.”293 It blamed society, the law, and the church, claiming that if the 
sentence was executed, “it will be deliberate, downright murder.”294 For 
“her death will be a far more horrible infanticide than was the killing of 
her child.”295 
In her first signed editorial on the case, Stanton portrayed the 
Vaughn case as one of seduction.296 She emphasized Vaughn as an inno-
cent girl of “good repute” whose “protector proved her betrayer” and 
turned her into the street “at the very time she needed shelter, love and 
care.”297 This characterization adopted the language of the criminal se-
duction laws, first passed in 1843, which punished those who “seduced 
women and engaged in sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman of 
previously chaste character under a promise of marriage.”298 Seduction 
was a popular defense for infanticide that many elites in the nineteenth 
century shared, as seen in both public and literary contexts.299 Some, like 
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the Female Moral Reform Society, called for regulation of seduction, not 
abortion, as the solution to the public outcry over women’s deaths from 
abortion sensationally portrayed in the media.300 Stanton, echoing the 
feminist voices in the Revolution, decried the double standard of sexual 
morality and the penal code that severely penalized infanticide for wom-
en, but exonerated the man involved in the initial seduction.301 “What a 
holocaust of women and children we offer annually to the barbarous cus-
toms of our present type of civilization, to the unjust laws that make 
crimes for women that are not crimes for men!”302 
Stanton then moved beyond the seduction defense to call women to 
action in defense of Vaughn.303 She compelled women, as a class, to em-
brace one of their own and to appreciate that her predicament and death 
sentence could happen to any one of their daughters. “In the name of 
womanhood, we implore the mothers . . . to rescue that defenceless girl 
from her impending fate. Oh! make her case your own.”304 She told a 
story of another case of infanticide among the upper class, in which a 
woman threw her baby into the sea.305 She continued, “[I]n the Court of 
Heaven that act was not registered to her account, but to a priest who had 
fled to foreign lands.”306 Stanton argued that the demands of justice 
should take the life of the seducer rather than the woman. “Men,” she 
claimed, “have made the laws cunningly, for their own protection; igno-
rantly, for they can never weigh the sorrows and sufferings of their vic-
tims.”307 
The Working Woman’s Association (WWA) responded to the call 
to take up the cause of Hester Vaughn.308 The WWA investigative com-
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mittee sent a delegation to Philadelphia “to have an interview with the 
doomed woman, and gain from her own lips the sad particulars.”309 They 
reported that “truth beamed from every feature of her expressive face.”310 
The delegation recast Vaughn as a girl “well reared by respectable par-
ents” in England who was deserted by her husband once they arrived in 
America.311 They reported how she managed as a servant, then a dairy-
maid, until “overcome, not in a moment of weakness and passion, but by 
superior strength—brute force—Hester Vaughan fell a victim to lust and 
the gallows.”312 
In December, WWA supporters met, raised donations for Vaughn, 
and passed resolutions challenging her conviction and condemning the 
death penalty in general.313 Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Trib-
une, and one of the supporters in attendance, cautioned the women 
against overstepping their argument by claiming that the death penalty 
itself was wrong.314 He urged them to stick with the argument that there 
was a lack of evidence against Vaughn in this case to support the imposi-
tion of such a penalty.315 The association ignored his advice and instead 
passed resolutions condemning both the death penalty in Vaughn’s case 
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and capital punishment across the board, arguing to banish from the land 
the “horrible relic of barbarism” that is “opposed to the genius of our 
institutions and the civilization of the age.”316 
Three days later, Stanton and her cousin, Elizabeth Smith Miller, 
presented the resolutions to the governor of Pennsylvania, Governor 
Geary.317 Geary was concerned that the women from New York were 
interfering with the jurisdiction of a neighboring state.318 He emphasized 
that the women of Pennsylvania, namely a Dr. Susan Smith, had already 
quietly been petitioning for Vaughn’s release.319 Geary reassured Stanton 
that he would not sign Vaughn’s death warrant and that she “was safe in 
his hands.”320 Stanton urged that “safety within the walls of a prison 
might not be the most desirable to an innocent woman,” and renewed her 
request for Vaughn’s release.321 The conversation veered toward the re-
form of prison conditions, which Geary, and later Geary’s wife, reported 
was a top priority of the governor.322 
Stanton and Miller continued on to Philadelphia to visit Vaughn in 
Moyamensing Prison.323 Stanton remarked that “on seeing the poor girl, 
our interest in her greatly intensified, and we felt more than ever con-
vinced of her innocence.”324 Stanton described Vaughn as a “short, stout 
girl,” with a “benevolent face,” “soft blue eyes,” and a quiet, gentle, self-
possessed manner.325 She commented on Vaughn’s ability to read and 
write, and remarked that she “is very intelligent for one of her class.”326 
Stanton recounted Vaughn’s story of desertion, betrayal, and disgrace, 
and how she was dragged by men in the depth of winter from her “bed of 
sickness” to the prison house.327 When Stanton complained to the guards 
of the mice and cockroaches that had bitten Vaughn, the guard curtly 
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replied that “a prison is not a hotel.”328 Stanton ended her essay with a 
call to individual responsibility toward helpless people suffering in jails 
and prisons. She pled for empathy: “If we could only make the sorrows 
of others our own we should have less patience with wrong and oppres-
sion.”329 
Stanton and the WWA committee developed two legal critiques of 
the Vaughn case based on (1) the insufficiency of the evidence and (2) 
the ineffective assistance of counsel.330 Arguing like a criminal defense 
lawyer, Stanton claimed that “every lawyer accustomed to examine evi-
dence must see the strong points for doubt as to her guilt.”331 She refer-
enced Archbold’s Criminal Practice and Pleading and its comments on 
infanticide, which concluded that “new-born infants are easily killed by 
cold and starvation”—two strong points in Vaughn’s case because she 
was alone in a cold room in the depth of winter for several days after the 
birth, “long enough, without any violence, for a child to die, with either 
cold or starvation.”332 Feminist supporter and physician, Dr. Clemence 
Lozier, offered another explanation for the baby’s death: puerperal mania 
and blindness caused by the birth made Vaughn unaware of her actions, 
and in her delirium, she may have lain on the baby after its birth.333 Dr. 
Lozier also emphasized that there was no evidence that the baby had in 
fact been born alive.334 She pointed out that no routine inquest had been 
made examining the infant’s lungs to determine if it had lived.335 The 
baby had been born prematurely at eight months, and Dr. Lozier said that 
“most babies born at this time did not live.”336 
Stanton argued that “there was so much room for doubt in the case 
that if she had been properly defended, the jury would either have acquit-
ted her, or disagreed,” either way resulting in her release.337 The ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim attacked the inadequacy of Vaughn’s 
lawyer, Mr. Goforth. He had failed to visit her in prison or consult with 
her regarding a defense, and he spoke with her only in open court.338 He 
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failed to raise any defense about the stillbirth of the child, the lack of 
witnesses, or the potential temporary insanity brought on by the birth.339 
Vaughn had paid him her last thirty dollars. Stanton and the working 
women criticized what they called “the $30 defence” with references to 
the betrayal of Jesus by Judas Iscariot for thirty pieces of silver.340 
The Revolution’s public defense of Vaughn triggered a backlash by 
some of the prominent papers in New York.341 Stanton’s coeditor, Parker 
Pillsbury, noted that “some of the city newspapers (not many, nor the 
best of them) complained that it was out of the province of the Associa-
tion to take cognizance of such an affair.”342 The complaints were that 
the labor organization should not be involved in issues of infanticide, 
women’s rights, or capital punishment. Eleanor Kirk defended against 
the attack repeating the equities of the case.343 Pillsbury defended the 
association on broader moral and political grounds of aiding a woman 
“in the deepest depths of sorrow,” helping one of their own working 
women, and seeing the implication of the issue for women’s rights.344 He 
reminded the reform community that the “abolitionists were long accus-
tomed to that type of humanity and philanthropy” as they had helped in-
dividual slaves obtain freedom in Canada.345 
In the spring of 1869, the Governor quietly pardoned Vaughn on 
the condition that she return immediately to England.346 When the New 
York supporters learned of her release, they expected to meet her at the 
train station with donation money in hand. Vaughn never appeared. In 
August 1869, Dr. Susan Smith sent a letter to the New York World af-
firming that Vaughn had returned safely to England and excerpted a let-
ter that she had received from Vaughn asking for the money her support-
ers had collected.347 Hester Vaughn was never heard of again. 
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C. A Jury of Her Own 
For Stanton, the Vaughn case and the subject of infanticide repre-
sented more than an individual injustice; it demonstrated the unaccepta-
bility of the all-male legal system. The case gave Stanton the opportunity 
to renew her twenty-year-old demand that women be given the right to a 
“trial by a jury of our own peers,” which she called the “most sacred of 
all rights.”348 
[T]rial by a jury of her peers has never yet been vouchsafed to 
woman. Here is a right so ancient that it is difficult to trace its origin 
in history, a right so sacred that the humblest criminal may choose 
his juror. But alas for the daughters of the people, their judges, ad-
vocates, jurors, must be men, and for them there is no appeal.349 
In the Vaughn case, Stanton developed two main arguments in sup-
port of the demand for women jurors: the male bias of the existing sys-
tem and the different perspective of women jurors.350 Women, she ar-
gued, would understand the social norms and double standards, the lim-
ited economic and social options for women, and the betrayal by a 
would-be suitor in a way that would excuse rather than condemn.351 
Under English common law adopted in the United States, women 
were excluded from juries because of “the defect of sex.”352 Little 
changed under the evolving American law. Although Wyoming briefly 
allowed female jurors in 1870, and Utah first allowed women in 1898, 
half of the states continued to exclude women from juries in the mid-
twentieth century.353 Women’s continued exclusion from juries was justi-
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 350. See infra text accompanying notes 356–61. 
 351. See infra text accompanying notes 362–65.  
 352. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 132 (1994) (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 362 n.4 (1765–1769)). 
 353. Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women’s Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of 
Difference?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1134–36 (1994). Women’s participation in Wyoming was 
initially desired because of the chaos and violence of the western territory when people called for 
moral and clear-headed jurors to contain the criminal activity, but a new chief justice reversed that 
thinking after just one year. Id.; see Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Other Side of the Woman Question, 
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fied on grounds of protecting fragile, vulnerable women from the deprav-
ity of trial, the incompetence of women to make reasoned judgments, and 
the greater need for women “as the center of home and family life” to 
remain at home.354 A brief exception to this common law rule of exclu-
sion was permitted during colonial times for a “jury of matrons” con-
vened to determine issues of paternity, abortion, infanticide, and other 
cases involving verification of pregnancy, which is where Stanton’s cri-
tique found grounding.355 
Stanton’s challenge to the all-male jury system began first with a 
deconstruction of the existing male bias. Stanton exposed the double 
standards of the social norms underlying the law and the inclination for 
men to protect one of their own: 
Where is he who by false vows thus blasted this trusting woman? 
Ah, he is freely abroad in the dignity of manhood, in the pulpit, on 
the bench, in the professor’s chair. The imprisonment of his victim 
and the death of his child, detract not a tithe from his standing and 
complacency. His peers made the law, and shall law-makers set nets 
for those of their own rank?356 
Stanton bolstered this social critique with legalistic arguments as to 
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude biased jurors.357 And she 
                                                                                                             
129 N. AM. REV. 432 (1879) (“On petit juries the women held the men up to a higher tone of morali-
ty and stricter sense of honesty than they would have exercised if left to themselves.” (quoting Wy-
oming Supreme Court Justice John Kingman)). 
 354. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 132; Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961); LINDA K. KERBER, NO 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 136, 144 
(1998); Grossman, supra note 353, at 1131, 1149, 1152; see Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman 
Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 59 (1986) (discussing stereotypes of the woman juror). 
 355. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 133 n.4.; KERBER, supra note 354, at 130; MARY BETH NORTON, 
FOUNDING MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 
225 (1996). The jury of matrons was used in the United States during the Colonial period, when 
midwives headed up panels of six or more women who investigated “matters involving women’s 
bodies and reproduction.” J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 133 n.4; NORTON, supra, at 225. This included collat-
eral issues, for example, in the case where a woman was subject to capital punishment, the jury of 
matrons determined whether the defendant was pregnant and, if so, stayed execution until after the 
birth. Grossman, supra note 353, at 1133 n.102. 
 356. Grossman, supra note 353, at 1133 n.102. 
 357. The Case of Hester Vaughan, supra note 286. Under English law, propter honoris 
respectium allows exception or challenge to a juror based on nobility because a defendant, like a 
commoner, is entitled to be tried by a jury of his peers according to class. JOHN COLBY, A 
PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 344–
45 (1868). Stanton argued that “[t]he nobleman cannot make just laws for the peasant; the slavehold-
er for the slave; neither can man make and execute just laws for woman, because in each case, the 
one in power fails to apply the immutable principles of right to any grade but his own.” The Case of 
Hester Vaughan, supra note 286. She continued, “in our country, the nobility are ‘white males’ who 
make laws for their own protection, in whose rights and privileges disfranchised classes have no 
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exposed the widely varying results between sentences of death for wom-
en like Vaughn and the exoneration of men who had killed their wives’ 
lovers by male jurors who accepted jealousy as mitigating justification. 
In fact, these men “are not only acquitted but feasted and toasted by the 
press and the people!”358 She focused on this legal inequality, decrying a 
system that makes “crimes for women that are not crimes for men.”359 
While they punish us for the violation of law, drag us into their 
courts to be tried not by our peers, but by judges, juror, lawyers, all 
men, they close their law schools against us. Nero was thought the 
chief of tyrants because he made laws and hung them up so high 
that the people could not read them, but all of our codes and consti-
tutions are sealed instruments to the women of this nation, with 
crimes for women that are not crimes for men, . . . [while] the erring 
girl of eighteen may be tried and hung for the crime of infanticide, 
he who betrayed her trust may sit in the jury-box or on the bench, 
with no true women to pity or protect.360 
Stanton’s argument here for a jury of her peers was cast as a demand—
an entitlement of women to equal political and property rights. 
Stanton’s second emphasis regarding juries was that men lacked the 
empathy to understand the mitigating circumstances that would lead a 
woman to commit infanticide. In 1854, she appealed to the New York 
legislature: 
                                                                                                             
part, hence the unequal laws women and negroes suffer to-day.” Id. Stanton also analogized to the 
challenge of propter affectum, which means “on account of bias,” in support of women challenging 
male jurors for appearance of bias or partiality because man was interested only in his own protec-
tion and was antagonistic to woman. Id. She cited a third peremptory challenge, propter delictum, 
which translates to “on account of crime,” to attack men as jurors for female defendants because of 
men’s crime of conspiring as a class against women under the law of their own making. Id. Finally, 
Stanton challenged the use of the peremptory challenge, propter defectum, which kept women off 
juries “for lack of proper qualification” and facetiously noted women’s “flattering” inclusion with 
other disqualified groups such as minors, aliens, slaves, and convicts. Id. 
 358. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Supposed Infanticide, REVOLUTION, Jan. 1869; Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, Address to Anniversary of American Equal Rights Association at New York City (May 12, 
1868); see also E. M. C., General Cole and Hester Vaughan, REVOLUTION, Dec. 31, 1868 (empha-
sizing the irony between infanticide death sentences and paramour acquittals, and arguing that wom-
en jurors could better sympathize with women). 
 359. Stanton, supra note 296. 
 360. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Strong-Minded Women of the Bible, REVOLUTION, Feb. 26, 
1868. To rectify this male-only legal system, Stanton called on women of “wealth, education and 
leisure” to “study the laws under which they live, that they may defend the unfortunate of their sex 
in our courts” and for Columbia Law School to open its doors to girls “who have brains to under-
stand the science of jurisprudence and hearts big enough to demand justice for the humblest of God’s 
children.” Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Hester Vaughan, REVOLUTION, Dec. 10, 1868. 
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Shall an erring woman be dragged before a bar of grim-visaged 
judges, lawyers and jurors, there to be grossly questioned in public 
on subjects which women scarce breathe in secret to one another? 
Shall the most sacred relations of life be called up and rudely 
scanned by men who, by their own admission, are so coarse that 
women could not meet them even at the pools without contamina-
tion? Shall the frenzied mother, who, to save herself and child from 
exposure and disgrace, ended the life that had but just begun, be 
dragged before such a tribunal to answer for her crime? How can 
man enter into the feelings of that mother? How can he judge of the 
mighty agonies of soul that impelled her to such an outrage of ma-
ternal instincts? 361 
Stanton emphasized women’s differences as a basis for obtaining 
women’s access to the political rights of jury service. The difference 
Stanton notes is based upon women’s experiences as mothers, both in 
pregnancy and in family relationships.362 She argued that men should not 
sit in judgment of “the mothers of the race,” who were superior to men in 
the “diviner elements of human nature, in love, spiritual perception and 
moral power.”363 She played the parent card, arguing that a father of a 
daughter who might be summoned for such a crime might prefer a jury 
of women: 
Would it not, in that hour, be some consolation to see that she was 
surrounded by the wise and virtuous of her own sex; by those who 
had known the depth of a mother’s love and the misery of a lover’s 
falsehood; to know that to these she could make her confession, and 
from them receive her sentence?364 
In highlighting women’s differences, Stanton perhaps played into the 
dominant ideology of the time of women as moral superiors who had a 
duty to educate children and control the moral compass of the family.365 
That argument would have resonated with her audience at that time. 
Stanton foreshadowed the idea of women’s differences as jurors 
that was later popularized by journalist and Pulitzer Prize-winning au-
                                                 
 361. Stanton, The Strong-Minded Women of the Bible, supra note 360. 
 362. See Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and 
Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 177 (1982) (arguing that women bring a unique perspec-
tive to a jury because “women’s life experiences still differ sufficiently from men’s that a diverse 
group of women would bring a somewhat different set of perceptions and insights to certain issues 
than would a similarly diverse group of men”). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Stanton, supra note 253. 
 365. For a discussion of “true woman” ideology, see Thomas & Boisseau, supra note 43, at 6. 
The moral superiority argument later expanded to serve as a basis for women’s right to vote in order 
to have moral actors making the laws for all of society. See id. 
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thor, Susan Glaspell.366 As a young journalist, Glaspell covered the trial 
and conviction of a wife for the murder of her husband.367 She subse-
quently wrote a story, “A Jury of Her Peers,” and a play, “Trifles,” 
dramatizing the absence of women on the jury.368 The story, like the case 
upon which it is based, develops the clues of what would now be called a 
battered women’s defense for the murder based on years of control and 
cruel treatment by the husband. The neighboring farm women who are 
called to the scene of the crime are the only ones to piece together the 
clues of a motive (murder of a beloved pet canary), and they destroy the 
evidence making conviction of the wife impossible.369 The men on the 
scene, the Sheriff and the prosecutor, are oblivious to the “trifles” of 
what the women see as obvious evidence and exoneration of the crime. 
Glaspell’s story demonstrates “that the different insights and understand-
ings women bring to the interpretation of facts may lead to more accurate 
factfinding,” thus capturing the essence of the legal argument about the 
necessity of including the different perspectives of women on juries.370 
This focus on women’s different perspective became the central ar-
gument in legal cases seeking women’s inclusion on juries “because ex-
cluding qualified women was tolerated by the courts.”371 The U.S. Su-
preme Court had struck down laws excluding African-American men 
from participation on juries in 1880 as a violation of the constitutional 
right of citizenship, but the Court refused to recognize jury service as one 
of women’s citizenship rights.372 Instead, the Court upheld exemption 
                                                 
 366. Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills “A Jury 
of Her Peers” Who Appreciate “Trifles,” 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 241 (1996). 
 367. State v. Hossack, 89 N.W. 1077 (Iowa 1902). The real case involved a lengthy history of 
domestic abuse against both the wife and children, though this evidence at the time would only en-
hance rather than mitigate the motive for the killing. The wife’s conviction for murder was over-
turned on the basis of improperly admitted evidence, and the retrial resulted in a hung jury. Angel, 
supra note 366, at 244. 
 368. Susan Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, EVERYWEEK, Mar. 5, 1917, at 42, reprinted in 
LIFTED MASKS AND OTHER WORKS 279 (Eric S. Rabkin ed., 1993); SUSAN GLASPELL, TRIFLES 
(1927), reprinted in LIFTED MASKS AND OTHER WORKS, supra at 263. See generally Patricia Bryan, 
Stories in Fiction and in Fact: Susan Glaspell’s A Jury of Her Peers and the 1901 Murder Trial of 
Margaret Hossack, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1997). 
 369. Angel, supra note 366. 
 370. Grossman, supra note 353, at 1145–46. 
 371. Id. at 1115–16. Liberal feminists in the 1920s moved toward an emphasis on women’s 
difference from men to seek “protective legislation like minimum wages, maximum hours, and fund-
ing for prenatal care generally focused on women’s distinctive responsibilities as mothers.” KERBER, 
supra note 354, at 183; see, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding women’s maxi-
mum hour law on grounds of women’s inherent difference and physical weakness). 
 372. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879); Grossman, supra note 353, at 1116 
(arguing that the Court implicitly recognized jury service as a right of citizenship for women finally 
in the 1994 case J.E.B.). 
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and rules designed to keep women off juries.373 When the Court did fi-
nally strike down the practice of all-male juries, it did so because of the 
defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment to a jury representative of 
a fair cross-section of the community, not because of the rights of the 
excluded women themselves.374 The Court held that an all-male jury was 
not truly representative, and a jury needed to include women’s different 
voices.375 The holding was reminiscent of the Court’s decision thirty 
years earlier in which it declared women eligible for federal jury service 
because of their differences.376 “The truth is that the two sexes are not 
fungible; . . . a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is exclud-
ed.”377 However, in 1994, in J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., the Court 
struck down a reliance on women’s difference as jurors in a case where 
the government’s peremptory challenges were used to dismiss men and 
empanel an all-female jury in a paternity case.378 The Court thus rejected 
any reliance on gender, and guaranteed women’s equal right to participa-
tion on the jury.379 
Justice O’Connor, however, was concerned that the J.E.B. Court 
was discarding an important aspect of gender in jury deliberation. She 
argued, “We know that like race, gender matters. . . . One need not be a 
sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a person’s gender and 
resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the 
case.”380 O’Connor cited studies showing female jurors were more likely 
to convict in rape cases, and she opined that gender likely made a differ-
ence in cases like sexual harassment, child custody, or spousal abuse.381 
She was concerned that in “the name of fighting gender discrimination,” 
the Court’s ruling on peremptory challenges might preclude a defendant 
like a battered wife “from using her peremptory challenges to ensure that 
the jury of her peers contains as many women members as possible.”382 
                                                 
 373. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961) (upholding an all-male jury’s conviction of a 
woman for killing her husband, and finding that it is not constitutionally impermissible to grant 
women an absolute exemption from jury service because women are responsible for home and fami-
ly life, and thus differentiation between men and women is reasonable and not discriminatory on the 
basis of sex); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 (1947) (upholding jury selection process of au-
tomatic exemption for women unless they affirmatively register). 
 374. Grossman, supra note 353, at 1129; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (revers-
ing conviction of man charged with aggravated kidnapping and rape of a young mother of three). 
 375. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532–33. 
 376. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193–94 (1946). 
 377. Id. 
 378. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 132 (1994). 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. at 148–49. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
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She hoped not, thus illustrating a shared appreciation for Stanton’s in-
sight that sometimes women’s differences are relevant. 
VI. STANTON’S REVOLUTION 
Stanton’s advocacy touched on issues of abortion by redirecting the 
debate to issues of women’s subordination. She illustrated the gendered 
nature of the abortion discourse from its moral blame of women, its orig-
ination and enforcement in a gendered legal system, and its foundation in 
social norms that denied women the right to control voluntary procrea-
tion. This focus was only a small part of Stanton’s larger lifelong advo-
cacy of women’s rights, but it remained consistent with her other work 
focused on deconstructing the implicit gender bias of the law and seeking 
equal treatment for women. 
Nevertheless, the “feminist case against abortion” continues to rely 
on a handful of historical evidence, which FFL claims demonstrates 
Stanton’s outspoken commitment to prolife positions.383 In addition to 
Howe’s quote and Stanton’s Infanticide and Prostitution article384 previ-
ously discussed—and distinguished—prolife advocates rely on two 
anonymous articles, Infanticide385 and Child Murder386 printed in the 
Revolution, and on the absence of abortion advertisements in the news-
paper. FFL and other prolife groups simply assumed that these unsigned 
articles and the advertisement policy are those of Stanton’s because they 
appear in her newspaper. This evidence, however, cannot be fairly at-
tributed to Stanton. It is more likely that they are the sentiments of Parker 
Pillsbury, Stanton’s male co-editor. Given Pillsbury’s daily editorial con-
trol of the paper, evidence of his beliefs against abortion from other arti-
cles in the paper, and his moralistic religious philosophy, it is possible, if 
not likely, that these sources can be attributed to him. Moreover, these 
articles, regardless of who wrote them, do not support the call for crimi-
nalization of abortion, but instead argue for alternative solutions, includ-
ing foundling homes for infants and the “empowerment and elevation of 
woman.” 
                                                 
 383. See FEMINISTS FOR LIFE, supra note 110; PROLIFE FEMINISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, 
supra note 5, at 15–21; Dannenfelser, supra note 85. 
 384. Stanton, supra note 274. 
 385. Infanticide, REVOLUTION, Jan. 29, 1868. 
 386. Child Murder, REVOLUTION, Mar. 12, 1868. 
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A. Writing Women’s Rights 
The Revolution was a national women’s rights newspaper founded 
by Stanton and Susan B. Anthony in January 1868.387 This weekly paper, 
published in New York City, ran for three years until financial problems 
forced the paper to close.388 The paper’s motto was “[p]rinciple, not poli-
cy: justice, not favors—Men, their rights and nothing more: women, their 
rights and nothing less.”389 When reform colleagues questioned Stanton’s 
choice of name for the paper, she replied with her usual acerbic wit that 
some might call the paper “The Rosebud,” but for her, “there is no name 
like the Revolution,” because “the establishing of woman on her rightful 
throne is the greatest revolution the world has ever known or will know. 
To bring it about is no child’s play.”390 Not only did the paper “insert 
women’s voices into public debates on many subjects, it also insisted that 
women’s rights be the major topic of the day.”391 
The Revolution was managed by a team of three: Anthony as “pro-
prietor,” business and financial manager, and Stanton and Parker Pills-
bury as content editors. Stanton spent much of the year traveling and 
speaking on the national lyceum tour, writing in her letters and contribu-
tions to the paper; Pillsbury handled the daily editing and production of 
                                                 
 387. Although the paper was not the first American newspaper dedicated to improving wom-
en’s status, it was perhaps the most famous one. THE REVOLUTION IN WORDS: RIGHTING WOMEN 
1868–1871, supra note 178, at 7 (citing the first woman’s rights paper as the Una edited by Paulina 
Wright Davis in 1853). “Stanton herself had been associated with the Lily, a temperance, women’s 
rights and dress reform journal of the 1850s. However, the Revolution was certainly the least tram-
meled and most daring feminist paper that had yet—and perhaps has ever—appeared.” DUBOIS, 
supra note 17, at 104. 
 388. The paper was initially funded by the controversial George Train, a feminist supporter but 
avowed racist who vitriolically opposed black suffrage. Stanton defended her affiliation with Train, 
saying she would “take the money where I can find it” and “would take aid from the devil himself.” 
Train supported the paper for only a short time, after his generous funds dried up when he was im-
prisoned in England and his assets seized for his involvement in the bombings in Northern Ireland in 
support of the Irish rebels. Stanton and Anthony were left with the entire financial burden of the 
paper. DUBOIS, supra note 17, at 103; GINZBERG, supra note 17, at 131. Subscriptions to the paper 
were few. In the first year, there was an overwhelming response and many subscriptions to the pa-
per, including one famously sent to the White House, but most were free, and few subscriptions were 
renewed. The reform community refused to support the newspaper because of its association with 
the racist George Train, the paper’s support of “easy divorce,” and opposition to the Fifteenth 
Amendment because of exclusion of female suffrage. The rivals in the women’s suffrage community 
established their own newspaper, edited by Lucy Stone, head of the American Woman’s Suffrage 
Association, called the Woman’s Journal. After the Revolution shut down, Anthony assumed the 
debt for the paper, and Stanton’s failure to share in this debt or work toward repayment was a point 
of contention between the two friends. 
 389. See, e.g., Masthead, REVOLUTION, Mar. 26, 1868. 
 390. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (Dec. 28, 1869). 
 391. THE REVOLUTION IN WORDS: RIGHTING WOMEN 1868–1871, supra note 178, at 5. 
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the newspaper in New York City.392 Pillsbury worked for the Revolution 
for two of its three years of operation, leaving in early 1870 when the 
paper could no longer afford to pay him.393 
The six-page newspaper covered issues of women’s rights in the 
first four pages, and then current political affairs, like President John-
son’s impeachment, in the back pages written by Pillsbury. It discussed 
and reprinted a variety of issues in order to “convey a complex sense of 
women’s oppression and a rich vision of their emancipation.”394 These 
issues included suffrage but extended beyond to address divorce, female 
farmers, infanticide, housekeeping, and the polygamy of the Utah Mor-
mons.395 In 1868, when the paper started, abortion was front-page news 
as the medical profession accelerated its antiabortion campaign and the 
New York legislature considered antiabortion reforms. Seeking to be 
relevant in the main political discourse, the Revolution occasionally re-
printed excerpts of articles from other papers like the New York Times, 
Sun, Herald, and World, followed by a short commentary. 
Modern antiabortion activists cite two anonymous articles from the 
Revolution during this time as evidence of Stanton’s position against 
abortion.396 These citations, indicating Stanton’s authorship, give no hint 
that the articles are actually unsigned. The first is a blurb entitled Infanti-
cide, which was published on January 29, 1868.397 Infanticide reprints a 
blurb from the New York Times about the mortality of infants who are 
boarded out and the increase in the practice for illegitimate children.398 
The second, Child Murder, published in March 1868, reports on a medi-
cal convention of the “regular” physicians drawing public attention to the 
“frightful increase” in infanticide and the alleged four hundred “murders 
                                                 
 392. GRIFFITH, supra note 17, at 144, 160–61; see also GINZBERG, supra note 17. Stanton 
traveled the circuit for eleven years, returning home to New Jersey for her children’s summer and 
winter breaks. Stanton said she toured for the income that she needed to provide for her family and 
pay for her children’s college educations (though her sister paid for Stanton’s two daughters to at-
tend Vassar College). 
 393. In May 1870, Laura Curtis Bullard, a wealthy writer, bought the Revolution for one dollar 
and changed it into a literary and society journal, which lasted only until early 1872. GRIFFITH, 
supra note 7, at 133. 
 394. THE REVOLUTION IN WORDS: RIGHTING WOMEN 1868–1871, supra note 178. 
 395. Id. 
 396. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 4; PROLIFE FEMINISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, supra 
note 5, at 48–50; Clark, supra note 95; Feminist History: Voices of Our Feminist Foremothers, 
FEMINISTS FOR LIFE, http://www.feministsforlife.org/history/foremoth.htm#ecstanton (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2012). 
 397. Infanticide, supra note 385. This was one week before Stanton’s signed piece, Infanticide 
and Prostitution, appeared. 
 398. Id. 
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annually produced by abortion” in one Maine county.399 From this se-
cond article, modern antiabortion activists emphasize the reaction to the-
se reports that “[t]here must be a remedy even for such a crying evil as 
this. But where shall it be found, at least where begin, if not in the com-
plete enfranchisement and elevation of woman.”400 This quote, they say, 
shows that Stanton condemned abortion as “evil.” 
These unsigned articles are attributed to Stanton by abortion oppo-
nents because they “infer her authorship from their appearance in her 
newspaper and their similarities to known Stanton texts.”401 However, 
Ann Gordon, the main scholar and archivist of Stanton’s papers, does not 
think that Stanton wrote either of these unsigned articles.402 Stanton gen-
erally signed all of her editorials when she was in town as “E.C.S.,” and 
she signed her letters from out of town with her full name.403 Notably, 
Stanton did sign the article immediately preceding the Infanticide article, 
thus suggesting that the subsequent anonymous editorial is not hers.404 
It is more likely that the anonymous editorial is the work of Stan-
ton’s male co-editor, Parker Pillsbury.405 Pillsbury had opportunity to 
print these views, as he was responsible for the daily content and publi-
cation of the paper. He would have been managing the content of the 
paper by reviewing submissions from readers and contributors and perus-
ing the headlines of the other newspapers. Pillsbury also demonstrated a 
propensity to air his own views as a newspaper editor, even when contra-
ry to the views of the editorial board, as he had done at his prior position 
as editor of the abolitionist newspaper, the National Anti-Slavery Stand-
ard, where his outspokenness cost him his job.406 And Pillsbury demon-
                                                 
 399. Child Murder, supra note 386.  
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Pillsbury also briefly served as editor of a radical abolitionist paper, the Herald of Freedom, in 1840, 
while the editor, Nathaniel Rogers, attended the World Anti-Slavery Convention in London. Id. at 
21. 
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strated the motive to print articles against abortion as evidenced by other 
signed editorials he wrote on the subject for the paper. 
Pillsbury expressed his own view against abortion in multiple arti-
cles in the Revolution.407 He discussed the “frightful” increase in abor-
tion, expressed abhorrence of the “evil” crime “foeticide” and the “kill-
ing the unborn,” and expressed outrage at the advertising of such immor-
al conduct.408 Others acknowledged Pillsbury’s strong sentiments against 
abortion.409 This view against abortion was consistent with Parker’s reli-
gious philosophy of perfectionism.410 He believed in a perfectionist the-
ology that, as its name suggests, promoted absolute commitment to un-
compromising moral standards, and refused to tolerate any degree of 
moral ambivalence in others.411 Pillsbury was a defrocked Congregation-
alist minister who had gained some notoriety as a zealous anti-slavery 
speaker.412 His license to preach had been revoked for his fanatical at-
tacks on the clergy and congregations for what he described as their hy-
pocrisy in claiming to be Christians.413 
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It cannot be assumed that Pillsbury’s own personal and religious 
views were shared by Stanton. Pillsbury had demonstrated his ability to 
depart from the preferred views of the editorial board. In fact, he had 
been forced to resign from his job as editor of the Standard when he ex-
pressed views contrary to the main view of the abolitionist paper.414 On 
another occasion, Stanton wrote in from her national tour chastising 
Pillsbury for an unflattering article about Mary Todd Lincoln.415 Moreo-
ver, the Revolution also allowed its editors free reign, giving Pillsbury 
the opportunity to present his own views without censorship.416 In its first 
issue, the Revolution made clear: 
[T]his journal is to represent no party, sect, or organization, but in-
dividual opinion; editors and correspondents alike, all writing, from 
their own stand point, and over their own names. . . . With both man 
and woman in the editorial department, we shall not have masculine 
and feminine ideas alone, but united thought on all questions of na-
tional and individual interest.417 
The paper was designed to promote debate and to provide a forum for its 
varied readership to discuss issues of the day including, but not limited 
to, women’s rights.418 Thus, given the independence of the editors, Pills-
bury’s motive of personal belief against abortion, and his opportunity to 
control the daily content of the paper, it is more likely that the anony-
mous author of these articles was Pillsbury. 
B. “Where Lies the Remedy?” 
Beyond authorship, what is significant about these articles is that 
they do not endorse the medical profession’s goal of passing new laws to 
criminalize abortion, but instead look to alternative social solutions. The 
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other mainstream papers, excerpted in the Revolution, demanded a solu-
tion to the problems of abortion, infanticide, and unwanted children, is-
suing the plea—“Where lies the remedy?”419 The Times answered the 
question by endorsing the regulation of abortion. The anonymous author 
of the Revolution editorials expressly responds to the question of “where 
lies the remedy?” with the empowerment of women. 
In Infanticide, the solution is in “the independence of woman.”420 
This article responds to a reprinted blurb on the topic of the abandonment 
of illegitimate children in boarding houses or “lying-in houses.”421 Wom-
en, usually poor women, went to these places during their lying-in period 
to give birth with the intent to abandon the baby. The author advocates 
that the “world of work be open to woman” and that women have their 
“own property and business.”422 “Our idea is, that every woman of sound 
mind and body, with brains and two hands, is more noble, virtuous and 
happy in supporting herself.”423 “So long as woman is dependent on 
man, . . . she will despise herself and hate him whose desires she gratifies 
for the necessaries of life; the children of such unions must needs be un-
loved and deserted.”424 The author blames the “startling facts” in the 
Times extract on men: “the masculine element is everywhere overpower-
ing the feminine, and crushing women and children alike beneath its 
feet.”425 It concludes with a call for women to assert themselves in purity, 
dignity, and true womanhood to end “the wholesale suffering and murder 
of helpless children.”426 
In Child Murder, the anonymous writer repeats the argument that 
the remedy for abortion lies in “the complete enfranchisement and eleva-
tion of woman.”427 It responds again to the question of “where lies the 
remedy?” by adopting the sensationalist title used in the Tribune and 
other papers of “child murder.” It begins by recognizing the prevalence 
of the abortion issue in the other papers, and the reported statistics on an 
apparent increase in both infanticide and abortion. “The public attention 
has been much drawn to this frightful subject of late. The disclosures 
made are appalling to the highest degree. . . . Infanticide is on the in-
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crease to an extent inconceivable.”428 It describes a report made by a 
medical convention of “regular physicians” in Maine that there were 
“four hundred murders annually produced by abortion.”429 The writer 
agrees that “[t]here must be a remedy for a crying evil as this.”430 The 
article continues to explain that “[f]orced maternity, not out of legal mar-
riage, but within it, must lie at the bottom of a vast proportion of such 
revolting outrages against the laws of nature and our common humani-
ty.”431 
The unsigned Child Murder article is similar in rhetorical flourish, 
word choice, and argumentation to an article written by Parker Pillsbury 
published two weeks later.432 In Foundling Hospitals, Pillsbury com-
mented that “[t]he frightful increase of foeticide, infanticide and child 
murder in every form, has forced the subject of Foundling Hospitals up-
on the public attention as never before.”433 He responds to an article ap-
pearing in the New York Times a few weeks earlier advocating the crea-
tion of a New York Foundling Hospital to address the widespread con-
cern about abandoned infants found nightly on the “streets, alleyways 
and doorsteps” by city police officers.434 Despite opposition claiming that 
these hospitals encouraged vice and immorality, the Times supported 
such institutions, which like similar institutions in Europe, avoided issues 
of infanticide and “the murder of children, either before or after birth,” 
by those forced to abandon their infant by economic necessity or social 
shame.435 Pillsbury was strongly in favor of such institutions, writing, 
“[i]t is difficult to imagine a pleasanter sight, and the aching heart of 
many a poor mother might be gladdened to behold her own child in such 
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a paradise.”436 Despite this embellishment, the statistics were grimmer: 
ninety percent of infants abandoned in such institutions died from lack of 
nourishment.437 These hospitals, however, offered a public policy solu-
tion to the identified problem of infanticide and abortion. 
C. The Absence of Abortion Advertisements 
Both infanticide and abortion thus personally troubled Pillsbury. He 
expressed his strong opposition to the inclusion of advertisements for 
abortion medicines in another piece for the Revolution entitled Quack 
Medicines.438 In this article, Pillsbury condemned public and religious 
newspapers for publishing advertisements for abortifacients.439 Main-
stream newspapers between 1840 and 1870 commonly published adver-
tisements for abortion medicines. As Pillsbury noted, “it is known to 
newspaper publishers that its advertising patronage pays far better than 
any other.”440 The thinly veiled ads for “French lunar pills” and “proce-
dures to assist with bringing on menstruation” fooled no one.441 Pillsbury 
argued that quack medicines, foeticides, and infanticides should be 
classed together and “regarded with shuddering horror by the whole hu-
man race.”442 Yet he realized, that “in every large city they hold more 
control over the public health and public morals, than all the regular 
medical school and the pulpit combined.”443 
In another article, Pillsbury repeated his abhorrence of those who 
encouraged the practice of abortion—“that very evil in all its horrible 
enormity and extent.”444 In a clear reference to Madame Restell, he be-
rated “those who make it a profession and grow enormously rich in the 
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murderous business; and yet walk unblushingly, and ride most magnifi-
cently on Broadway in broad day, and receive both the gratitude and gold 
of those who employ them.”445 He also condemned the advertisements 
for abortion services, excoriating “the not less inexcusable crime of those 
newspapers that advertise for greed and gain, the loathsome operators of 
the abomination!”446 
The strong aversion to such popular (and lucrative) ads was then, 
explicitly Pillsbury’s. His attack on the practice in Quack Medicines ex-
plains the lack of such advertisements in the Revolution.447 Moreover, 
New York outlawed such advertisements in 1868, shortly into the pa-
per’s tenure.448 The state’s first anti-obscenity statute expressly banned 
ads related to “an article or medicine for the prevention of conception or 
procuring of abortion.”449 The lack of such ads in the paper for most of 
its operation simply conforms to this law. Therefore, no inferences about 
Stanton’s views about abortion can be drawn from the absence of abor-
tion ads in the Revolution. 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND 
FFL now claims that Stanton agreed with the organization’s posi-
tion on the social causes that force women to have abortions. It is true 
that Stanton did share an understanding of women’s economic and edu-
cational oppression and abandonment by male partners.450 Thus, it is pos-
sible to argue that there is common ground between Stanton and FFL, as 
there is between prochoice and prolife groups more generally on “reduc-
ing unwanted pregnancy and making it possible for women to be both 
mothers and equal citizens participating in economic and social life.”451 
However, a shared appreciation for some of the causes of abortion does 
not mean an agreement about the solution. 
This claim of “common ground” is often expressed by prochoice 
leaders seeking to reach out to antiabortion groups in some kind of com-
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promise. For example, then-Senator Hillary Clinton’s platform on abor-
tion was that “[n]obody wants to need an abortion,” echoing the refrain 
of Catholic antiabortion groups and Planned Parenthood.452 Abortion is 
“a sad, even tragic choice to many, many women,” said Clinton.453 Going 
further, she argued that “[t]here is no reason why government cannot do 
more to educate and inform and provide assistance so that the choice 
guaranteed under our constitution either does not ever have to be exer-
cised or only in very rare circumstances.”454 In 2009, a newly elected 
President Barack Obama articulated a similar “common ground agenda” 
on abortion in a controversial speech at a Notre Dame graduation in an 
attempt to reach out to antiabortion activists on shared grounds of sup-
porting women who choose to continue a pregnancy.455 The Obama Ad-
ministration pursued this common ground agenda by quietly enacting the 
Pregnancy Assistance Funds authorized by the Stanton Act.456 
But agreement on the common ground idea that abortion should 
ideally be rare does not mean that abortion foes agree on the rest of the 
equation and the “ultimate question of state regulation of women’s re-
productive decisions.”457 Clinton, for example, finds the solution not in 
restricting choice, but in preventing unwanted pregnancies, supporting 
“sex education, family planning, and requiring health insurers to cover 
contraception.”458 FFL today does not support the right to access birth 
control, and instead focuses on societal accommodation of pregnant 
women to permit all pregnancies to continue, even in cases of rape, in-
cest, and threat to the life of the mother.459 Other prolife advocates such 
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as 2012 presidential contender Rick Santorum explicitly reject contracep-
tion.460 Thus, a shared appreciation that abortion is not an ideal outcome 
does not mean that prochoice and prolife advocates agree on restriction 
of women’s rights. To the contrary, as Hillary Clinton said, “let’s not 
forget the importance of the freedom of women to make the choices that 
are consistent with their faith and their sense of responsibility to their 
family and themselves.”461 
Thus, the overlapping concerns between Stanton and FFL on issues 
of women’s economic and educational deficits that can contribute to 
abortion decisions does not mean that Stanton agreed with the regulation 
of abortion and the restriction of women’s liberty. Stanton never gave 
any indication that she supported the criminalization of abortion advo-
cated by the mainstream press. To the contrary, her writings include a 
demand for the self-ownership of women and the right to be “sovereign 
of her own person,” singularly responsible for deciding issues of procrea-
tion. She rejected aspects of the abortion debate that told women their 
duty and sole purpose was to bear children, and she instead advocated for 
women to avoid childbirth and to maintain their individual womanhood 
and control over their own body. 
The adoption of Elizabeth Cady Stanton as an historical spokesper-
son against abortion is, therefore, not justified, and it is misleading to 
continue to misappropriate her image in this way. Our heroines in history 
come with a mixed bag of attributes, some of which resonate with mod-
ern audiences, while others appall. Stanton is no exception. She brought 
much radical change to the advocacy and reforms of the women’s 
movement, providing the foundational political and philosophical efforts 
for many reforms we accept today. Yet she also brought with her nativist 
and racist rhetoric, employed to oppose the Fifteenth Amendment be-
cause it excluded women’s suffrage.462 She advocated procreation theo-
ries of healthy children and healthy pregnancies that mimic today’s ac-
cepted theories of “what to expect when you’re expecting,” even while 
they included darker elements of eugenics.463 Thus, attributing modern 
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day sentiments to past history is messy as we seek to find important con-
nections with the past while discarding those beliefs that have been re-
jected. 
Although we can parse through the historical record to find nuggets 
of truth and evolutionary legal change, we cannot simply ignore or invent 
a reality. Historians warn of the dangers of presentism—the interpreta-
tion of history through a modern lens by trying to fit people, views, and 
events of the past into contemporary boxes. Politicians and lawyers, 
however, continually search for historical relevance, seeking to use histo-
ry to bring meaning to the present. They search for rationales and support 
for policy decisions, and history provides one source of evidence that can 
be offered as persuasive argument. It is important, however, to under-
stand history for what it is. We must be clear about what it is, and is not, 
before seeking to use it as a basis for new social and legal policy. 
One conservative scholar accused contemporary feminist scholars 
of doing just this, twisting the historical record for political purposes and 
“obfuscating nineteenth century feminist attitudes.”464 He observed that a 
particular political agenda might cause “scholars to miss the fact that al-
though one might not be able to determine the truth in any ultimate 
sense, one often can recognize lies.”465 He chastised political misrepre-
sentation: “The plain fact is that no historian can afford to ignore ‘the 
stubborn resistance of the raw materials.’”466 And he concluded that “we 
can distinguish between the truth and the untruth of certain facts about 
the past even while we quarrel about the significance of these truths. His-
tory is more than a process of projecting our wishes onto the past.”467 
This critique seems particularly fitting to those who promote an un-
founded history of antiabortion feminist leaders. 
It is simply not the case that nineteenth-century feminist leaders ex-
pressed explicit and unanimous support for the criminalization of abor-
tion because of the concern of the morality of prenatal life.468 Similarly, 
it is not true that “Stanton and Anthony expressed concern against child 
murder.”469 As this Article has demonstrated, the few feminist voices 
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joining the periphery of the abortion debate did not support the regula-
tion of abortion. Instead, these writers defended women against the abor-
tion campaign’s attack and shifted the moral blame to men and to socie-
ty’s oppression of women. What feminists did unanimously endorse was 
voluntary motherhood and the right of women to control procreation 
through abstinence. Stanton expanded on this idea, arguing for a wom-
an’s right to be the “sovereign of her own person,” which meant the right 
to choose when and under what conditions she would become pregnant. 
Stanton empathized with women who had unwanted pregnancies and 
argued against a legal system that imposed punishment upon women for 
infanticide. This advocate of women’s individual right to control makes 
an unlikely leader for today’s antiabortion movement. 
The hope for common ground has political appeal, particularly be-
tween entrenched long-term adversaries such as those existing in the de-
bate over abortion. But co-opting historical feminist beliefs that are silent 
on the precise issue of abortion does not create a credible basis for shared 
ground. The hope for mutual understanding, however, continues. As 
President Obama pleaded, “[w]hen we open up our hearts and our minds 
to those who may not think precisely like we do or believe precisely 
what we believe—that’s when we discover at least the possibility of 
common ground.”470 This is something with which Elizabeth Cady Stan-
ton might have agreed, as she argued for radical change to the law, reli-
gious norms, and social practices to accomplish the full liberation of 
women. 
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